Description of the T 60 tank. Tactical and technical characteristics of tanks

If you start talking about USSR tanks during the Great Patriotic War, the first thing that comes to mind, of course, is the T-34. Following him, the IS or HF will probably come to mind. Someone will mention pre-war armored vehicles, which were used to a limited extent at the end of the war. Meanwhile, the brunt of the battles of the early period of the war fell on the T-60.

This light tank, created in as soon as possible based on an already outdated design, it defended Moscow and Leningrad. Sometimes “sixties” receive unflattering assessments, even to the point of declaring them “unnecessary” altogether. But it was precisely these “unnecessary” “wedges” that turned out to be critically needed by the Red Army, and the significance of their role cannot be underestimated.

History of creation

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Moscow plant No. 37 developed and began producing the T-40 light amphibious tank. According to the classification of that time, such equipment was considered a special class of “small tanks”. They were instructed to conduct reconnaissance and participate in counter-guerrilla warfare - that is, to solve tasks usually assigned to armored vehicles.

The T-40 became the most advanced “small tank”, but in the outbreak of war it was of little use. The lack of middle-class equipment led to attempts to use the T-40 for direct infantry support. Bulletproof armor and machine gun armament were too weak for such tasks.

Plant No. 37 received an order to curtail the production of small T-40s and begin production.

Yes, the T-50 was much more heavily armed, well armored and at the same time mobile - but the plant simply could not carry out the order. A complete re-equipment of the enterprise was required, but there was no time or money for this. The forced downtime could not have a positive effect on the overall rate of tank production.

Chief designer of the plant N.A. Astrov put forward a counterproposal - to prepare a new combat-ready tank, the T-60. The prototype with an unarmored hull was built in just a month. Astrov personally drove it to the GAZ plant, where they began to master serial production of the car. In the fall of 1941, new Soviet tanks were already fighting.

Construction, crew, communications

The T-60 was greatly simplified compared to the background of pre-war vehicles. Aluminum and duralumin parts were replaced with cast iron, the floor in the body and the engine shield were removed. All amphibious equipment has been removed.

The hull and turret of the T-60 were welded from rolled homogeneous armor of high hardness.

Replacing cemented T-40 armor with homogeneous armor made it possible to increase production volumes while maintaining acceptable bullet resistance. The armor plates of the forehead and stern were installed at rational angles of inclination, with the exception of the vertical sides. Some armor plates were made removable - to make it more convenient to service the units.

The maximum armor thickness initially reached 20mm. When the first battles showed the vulnerability of the T-60 even to anti-tank rifles, the armor was strengthened. At first the problem was solved by installing additional screens, and from 1942 the cases were assembled from thicker sheets - up to 35 mm. The octagonal turret with sides 25mm thick was shifted to the left, since the right side of the hull was occupied by the engine compartment. From February 1942, the thickness of the sides was also increased to 35 mm.

The crew of the vehicle consisted of two tankers. The driver sat in the center of the hull; he had at his disposal a viewing device with an armored shield. To leave the vehicle (or enter it), the tank driver used the hatch in the roof of the armored cabin on the front plate. The tank commander, who was also a gunner and loader, sat in the turret. For emergency evacuation of the crew there was a hatch in the bottom of the hull.

Communications on linear T-60s were reduced to a light-signal device with colored bulbs, through which the commander gave orders to the driver. Such a device was available in early series, and was quickly abandoned. Communication with the infantry and other vehicles was ensured by flags - a special hatch was provided for them in the turret. Command vehicles, unlike linear ones, had both a tank intercom and a walkie-talkie with a communication range of up to 16 km.

But in July 1941, a decree of the State Defense Committee ordered the arming of the T-60 with 20mm caliber. Its tank version, created from wing and turret gun assemblies, received the designation TNSh (Tank Nudelman-Shpitalny). Ammunition - 750 rounds, in belts with a capacity of 58 rounds. Armor-piercing incendiary and fragmentation shells were used for firing.

Armor-piercing shells made it possible to fight light equipment, and the low barrier effect to some extent compensated for the high rate of fire of the gun (up to 800 rounds per minute). Likewise, with a low power fragmentation projectile, a high rate of fire made it possible to create a high density of fire. According to some reports, since 1942, the selection of projectiles has been expanded with sub-caliber shells with a tungsten core, but there is no reliable evidence of this.

The insufficient effectiveness of the ShVAK cannon was already noted during testing of the T-60, so work on creating a more effective weapon began immediately.

A DT machine gun was paired with the cannon; its ammunition capacity consisted of 15 discs (945 rounds). If necessary, the machine gun was removed and used like a manual one. The installation was aimed at the target using a TMFP telescopic sight and a spare mechanical one. Boxes with shots were stacked in a rack on the bottom, machine-gun disks - above the stack with cannon ammunition. For self-defense of the crew there was a bag with 10 F-1 grenades.

The entire right side of the hull was occupied by the engine compartment. The GAZ-202 engine is an in-line six-cylinder, four-stroke - a version of a car engine with hp reduced from 85 to 70. power. When there were not enough engines, less powerful units from the GAZ-M1 were installed.

The engine was started using the crank; the starter was only allowed to be used in combat conditions.

In the stern, behind an armored partition, radiators and fuel tanks were located. Two hand-held fire extinguishers served as fire-fighting equipment.

A manual transmission with a four-speed gearbox was placed in the nose of the tank. Control was carried out through simple mechanical drives.

The T-60 chassis was borrowed from the T-40. The suspension design remained torsion bar, there were no additional shock absorbers.

Performance characteristics in comparison with similar vehicles

The airborne “Tetrarch” was chosen as the British analogue of the T-60, as it is the closest in terms of the year it was put into service and its mass-dimensional characteristics.

	T-60	Pz.Kpfw.IIAusf. C	M3	Mk.VII "Tetrarch"
Dimensions
Length, m	4,1	4,81	4,53	4,6
Width, m	2,4	2,28	2,24	2,39
Height, m	1,7	2,02-2,15	2,64	2,02
Combat weight, t	6,4	9,5	12,68	7,6
Armament
Armament	1 x 20 mm TNSh-20 1 x 7.62 mm DT	1 × 20 mm KwK 30, 1 × 7.92 mm MG-34	1 × 37 mm M6 5 x 7.62 mm М1919А4	1 x 40mm QF 2-pounder 1 × 7.92 mm BESA
Booking
Body forehead	30-35 mm	29-34.5 mm	16-44 mm	16 mm
Sides and stern of the hull	15- 10 mm	14.5 mm	25 mm	14-10 mm
Tower forehead	20 mm	34.5 mm	38 mm	16 mm
The sides and stern of the tower	25 mm	14.5 mm	25 mm	14-10 mm
Mobility
Engine	carburetor 6-cylinder in-line GAZ-202, 70 hp	carburetor 6-cylinder in-line "Maybach" HL 62 TRM, 140 l. With.	carburetor 7-cylinder radial "Continental" W-670-9A, 250 l. With.	carburetor 12-cylinder opposed Meadows MAT, 180 hp
Specific power, l. s./t	12	14,7	17,9	21,0
Maximum speed on the highway, km/h	42	40	58	64
Cruising range on the highway, km	450	190	113	224

In terms of armor protection parameters, the T-60 was generally not inferior to its competitors; combined with its smaller dimensions and visibility, this greatly reduced its vulnerability. On the other hand, British and American vehicles were armed with more powerful guns.

The main light tank of the Wehrmacht, the Pz.II, like the T-60, carried a 20-mm air cannon, which roughly equalized their combat capabilities.

Combat use

In the battles near Moscow, the T-60 received its baptism of fire. The 21st Tank Brigade was the first to receive these light tanks in October 1941. By November, all of its T-60s were lost in battle. The production of medium tanks at that time was insufficient, and light tanks had to be forced to replace them. Participating in frontal attacks together with T-34s and KVs, T-60s suffered heavy losses. Light vehicles were able to knock out German tanks only under a fortunate combination of circumstances.

In the spring of 1942, 60 light tanks were transferred along the river to Leningrad.

By the beginning of the Kharkov operation, the number of T-60s in the troops was still significant, but by this time the Nazis had already received more powerful anti-tank guns and tanks with enhanced protection. Experienced tankers were still able to operate effectively on the T-60.

In general, its weapons and armor were clearly insufficient - even for infantry support tasks. The T-60s performed best in reconnaissance - but in the presence of experienced commanders. From the end of 1942, light tanks moved from the front line to the rear. In the same 1942, the production of the T-60 was completed - it gave way to the more powerfully armed and better protected T-70.

But this does not mean that the T-60’s combat journey is over. When they broke through the blockade of Leningrad, it was the T-60s that captured the bridgehead, crossing the Neva, and were the first to link up with units of the Volkhov Front. The tanks received this important role for objective reasons - the light weight of the T-60 made it possible to cross the river on ice. And even after leaving the front line, the T-60 continued to be used for the very tasks that the “small” T-40 tank was supposed to perform - fighting saboteurs in the rear, guarding troops on the march, reconnaissance in force.

Light tanks were actively used as training vehicles. They were removed from service after the end of the war. It is noteworthy that all surviving T-60s were sent for processing. Museum T-60s of the present time are vehicles restored by restorers that were lost in battle.

A number of T-60s were captured by the enemy.

The Wehrmacht and the Romanian Army used them in rear units, in police divisions and as artillery tractors. The Romanians even converted about 30 vehicles into self-propelled guns with a 76.2mm F-22 cannon.

Footprint in history, project evaluation

If you do not take into account the conditions in which the T-60 was created, then it is very easy to brand it as an obvious step back. The T-50 tank was superior in all respects and met the needs of the troops much better. But the T-60 was not a simplified version of the “fifty”, but, in essence, a deep modernization of the obviously outdated T-40.

The aircraft gun, which was never intended to fight armored vehicles, could barely cope with this task. It was difficult for a crew of two - instead of controlling the situation in battle, the commander fired and loaded the weapon. Primitive observation devices and the lack of radio communications (on most tanks) did not allow the “sixty” to become a full-fledged reconnaissance vehicle.

But the designers, led by N.A. The Astrovs did not need to develop a tank that was “ahead of its time” and “unparalleled” to satisfy imperial ambitions - they created a reliable, combat-ready vehicle, the production of which could easily be established at their plant.

When any tanks were needed for defense - as long as they were massive - and time was ticking by the days, the adoption of even an “unnecessary” tank seemed completely justified.

At the same time, there are no flaws in the design of the T-60 - it would even be one of the best in its class. It’s just that the whole class has become outdated.

Conclusion

The Soviet light tank T-60 is a combat vehicle that should not have existed at all. If not for the war, the plant would simply switch to producing more modern vehicles (the same T-50).

And if the beginning of the war had not turned out to be so tragic, the need to create “at least some” tank as a temporary measure would not have arisen. And Astrov’s team managed to create a fairly successful vehicle, which really allowed the USSR to hold out during the period when the production of medium and heavy tanks was just getting started.

The heavy losses of the T-60 are not explained by the fact that it was so bad - it’s just that the “sixty” had to fight an unequal fight. And ultimately, he won it, making his contribution to the overall victory.

Video

The T-60 tank is the most numerous small tank (according to the pre-war classification) of the war period. The peak of the T-60's combat performance occurred in the second year of the war, but single tanks fought until the summer of 1944. Tankers who fought on it often cannot talk about their many victories. There are different assessments of the T-60, both good and bad. But still, it should be noted that this tank was able to fill the need for tanks that the army suffered during the first war months. GABTU was aware that the T-60 is a full-fledged light tank, but as a means of supporting infantry, fighting LBT, and field artillery, the tank, although limited, was suitable.

The basis for the creation of the T-60 tank.

The beginning of the Patriotic War brought serious changes to the development of tank building in the USSR. In the very first month of the war, he put an end to many promising programs, as well as the serial production of a number of armored vehicles and weapons.

In particular, at plant No. 31 named after. Orzhonikidze, the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars provided for the completion of the production of T-40 tanks, as well as light Komsomolets tractors, by the beginning of August of this year. In exchange, the T-50 tank was required to be mastered in series within two months. The Podolsk plant was supposed to be the supplier of towers and hulls. In addition to it, it was planned to use about 50 more enterprises in Moscow and the region for production as related factories.

The decision to replace the T-40 tank with the T-50 in mass production looks quite reasonable. The competition for amphibious tanks as reconnaissance vehicles came from armored vehicles, which were cheaper both to operate and produce and, as a result, more widespread.

The LB-62 armored vehicle could provide tough competition to the T-40. Similar in cross-country ability and armor protection with the same turret and armament, it was at the stage of being adopted for service. Potentially, it could be more massive than a reconnaissance tank.

However, as a tank the T-40 was seriously inferior in combat capabilities to the T-50. This vehicle was supposed to replace the T-26, thus becoming the most widespread in the Soviet tank fleet. And as a result, the need for the T-50 was great. Under the current conditions, mastering it in production was a matter of paramount importance. However, its design was complex even for the manufacturer.

History of creation.

Plant No. 37 was clearly not ready for the production of a tank of such a class as the T-50, in addition, the production of V-4 diesel engines at that time was only in the development stage at Kharkov Plant No. 75. As a result, the production of the T-50 on a national scale was practically stopped.
Under these conditions, thoughtless implementation of the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars led to the cessation of production of light tanks altogether. Fortunately, both the management of the plant and its design bureau under the leadership of N.A. were clearly aware of the state of affairs with plant No. 37 mastering the production of new equipment. Astrov.

The plant could not refuse to develop the production of the T-50. And even more, the design bureau carried out a preliminary design of its floating version. However, in an atmosphere of secrecy, work was carried out to simplify the design of the T-40. As a result, there was confidence in the possibility of producing the car in significant quantities.

The proposal was presented in the form of a letter signed by the military representative of the plant and Astrov himself. It provided justification for the impossibility of mastering the production of a new light tank, and a proposal to master the production of a small tank and produce it in large volumes.

The initiative aroused Stalin's interest. V.A. Malyshev, who was appointed curator of the project, was sent to the plant to familiarize himself with the details. Having studied the situation at the plant and familiarized himself with the project, Malyshev supported the initiative of the plant workers.

The tank, which from the very beginning received the index T-60 (or index 030 as it appeared in the factory correspondence), was a non-floating version of the T-40 tank. And in mid-July forty-one, by decree of the State Defense Committee, plant No. 37 was ordered to organize its serial production.

However, the production of 030 did not solve all the problems. Weak point T-40 had a structural and technological complexity of hulls and turrets, which led to
To a large number marriage. Which actually brought the T-40 production program to the brink of failure. In accordance with the plan for the production of ten thousand T-60 tanks, the number of related enterprises was supposed to increase further.

In such a situation, the only correct solution was to simplify the shape of the T-40 hull. As a result, the KhTZ and GAZ plants, which were supposed to be involved in the production of the T-60 (manager index 060), received a vehicle for production that was already different from the original one. While plant No. 37 was supposed to maintain the production of the T-60 (factory index 030) unchanged until the end of the year. The decision was dictated both by the fear of a decrease in production volume and by the liquidation of the backlog of T-40 hulls. Which led to the release of the tank known as the T-30.

As for the designation T-70, in relation to vehicles produced by the GAZ and KhTZ plants, it was used quite rarely. In correspondence it was more often called T-60M, “T-60 with a simplified body” or simply T-60.

Worthy of mention is the fact that the 060, like the 030, was put into service even before experimental tanks were built. This is especially surprising in relation to 060. If 030 was essentially a simplified T-40, then 060 is already significantly to a greater extent different from the T-40. The time spent on simplifying the machine took about a week.

The layout of the T-60 (factory index 060) largely repeated that of the T-40 tank, but there were also significant changes. The most significant concerned:

• dimensions and layout of the engine compartment. Changes to the dimensions of the engine compartment had to be made due to acute problems with the supply of the GAZ-202 engine that arose in 1940. To overcome the problem, it was decided to install the ZIS-16 engine (ZIS-5, boosted version), which required increasing the dimensions of the engine compartment. In the summer of 1941, the problem with the supply of GAZ-202 was overcome, but it became possible to install both the GAZ-202 and, after modifications in the engine compartment, the ZIS-5 in the tank;
• weapons. The initial plan provided for armament at the level of the T-40 tank, i.e. a machine-gun pair of DShK and DT. However production capacity Plant No. 507, which produced DShKs, could not ensure their production in quantities sufficient for the production program of the T-60 tank. As an alternative, it was decided to arm the vehicle with a 20-mm tank gun based on the aviation ShVAK. The tank version of the ShVAK-TNSh was developed without constructing radically new parts. The sight remained the same - TMFP, borrowed from the DShK and DT pair.

T-60 tank production centers.

From September 1941 until July 1942, four tank production centers produced approximately six thousand tanks. In December 1941, plant No. 264 in Sarepta joined the T-60 production program; in January 1942, plant No. 37, evacuated to Sverdlovsk, assembled its first tank. At the same time, the production of the car began at plant No. 38 in Kirov.

According to production plans, plant No. 37 should launch production of T-60 1.08. 1941, after 15 days it was to be joined by GAZ and KhTZ. This plan failed. Due to the failure of related factories to supply hulls, turrets, weapons, surveillance devices, and other things, GAZ was able to begin assembling the experimental tank only on August 17, while the hull was made of non-armor steel, and the turret and weapons were supplied from the T-40.

The deployment of production of T-60 tanks at GAZ came at the cost of curtailing production programs for other products. In particular, this affected motor transport. Production actually stopped in October passenger cars GAZ-61, because they required a scarce engine. The production of GAZ AAA and GAZ AA trucks has been reduced to a minimum extent. Car production is finally organized by GAZ, producing PPSh and mortars.

The situation at KhPZ was even more complicated. The first drawings of the T-60 arrived only in last days July, but the full documentation was not received by August 15, the day when production of the machine was supposed to begin. Just like GAZ, KhTZ was faced with a lack of supply of components from related factories.

Except objective reasons There were still subjective factors that complicated the development and production of the T-60. The plant's management was so keen on the idea of ​​producing the HTZ-16 armored tractor of its own design that even in the second half of September 1941 they dreamed of parallel production of an armored tractor and a tank.

The Kharkovites were able to produce their first T-60 only on September 16, 1941, with a month delay in the start of production. After 10 days, evacuation work began at the plant, and by the twentieth the Germans came close to the city. The plant was supposed to be evacuated to Stalingrad, but the equipment could not be completely removed.

Production of the T-60 was launched at the Stalingrad plant only in December 1941, when the plant reported the production of the first 45 vehicles, although it was planned to deliver the first 50 tanks in November.

The last plant to join the production of T-60 tanks was plant No. 38 in Kirov. In October 1941, the Kolomna Machine-Building Plant began to move to the base of the Kirov Machine-Building Plant for evacuation. The latter was supposed to participate in the T-60 production program as a related plant, producing T-60 turrets. After the final move and expansion, the production of both plants was merged and renamed as Plant No. 38. The plant delivered its first cars in February 1942.

Description of the tank design.

The general layout of the T-60 is similar to that of the T-40 tank:

• control compartment of the T-60 tank - in the front of the vehicle;
• combat - the middle part of the hull;
• transmission - in the front part of the armored hull on the right side along the way;
• engine compartment - along the middle part of the starboard side
• tanks are in the stern.

The T-60 was controlled by a crew of 2 tankers, who were located in the front part (mechanical water), as well as the turret and turret space (commander). In the middle part of the armored hull along its right side there was a GAZ-202 engine. Its drive wheels are the front of the hull.

T-60 tank hull made from rolled homogeneous armor plate (20, 15, 13, 10, 6 mm). Beginning in 1942, some combat vehicles acquired shielded hulls and turrets (20-35 mm), and in February production began producing armored hulls made from 20-35 mm sheets. The forehead sheets of the armored hull were connected at a large angle. The sides of the hull were made of 2 sheets connected by welding. The top of the hull consisted of a turret plate, a removable rear plate, and a plate above the MTO.

The bottom of the tank consisted of 3 sheets. It contained: an emergency hatch under the mechanical drive, hatches for draining oil and fuel.

The mechanical drive was located in the middle of a small armored cabin, closed by a folding frontal shield. There is an entrance hatch above his head. Observation - using a triplex device.

The tower is a welded structure, octagonal, truncated at the top. 25 mm thick, later - at the end of February - 35 mm. Some of the T-60s had turrets shielded with 10-mm armor plates, and some of the GAZ vehicles and the manager. No. 38 were equipped with conical turrets, similar to those of the T-40. The sides of the tower are equipped with turret ports and observation devices. The front part of the turret at the front is covered with a welded mask with embrasures for the sight, TNSh, DT.

There is a hatch in the roof of the tower with a signal hole cut through it. Some of the vehicles also had a ventilation hole under the armored cover.

The T-60 tank had a 4-stroke, 6-cylinder gasoline engine GAZ-202. The engine was started by an electric starter or by a crank in case of failure.

The engine was powered by B-70 or KB-70 aviation gasoline. Both gas tanks with a combined capacity of 320 liters are in the aft compartment on the left side and were fenced off with an armored fence. To the right of the tanks is the radiator and engine cooling fan.

Tank armament in the turret and consisted of a 20-mm TNSh and a twin 7.62-mm DT. The gun barrel is 82.4 caliber. For ease of operation, the gun is shifted to the right side of the longitudinal axis. The diesel engine was installed in a ball mount and, if necessary, was easily removed. UVN of weapons from -7 to +25°.

To aim the gun, a TMFP telescopic sight was used, as well as a direct fire sight of a mechanical type. The firing range at the sight from the T-60 is 2500 m, the rate of fire of the TNSh is up to 750 rpm. The TNSh ammunition included BZT, OST, OZ rounds.

The ammunition included:

• 754 20 mm unitary rounds (158 rounds packed in 13 boxes);
• 945 cartridges for diesel fuel (packed into 15 disks.

The transmission consisted of:

• final drive;
• Automotive-type gearbox - four forward and one reverse gears;
• 2 single-row final drives;
• side clutches equipped with band brakes;

Chassis- torsion bar. Fine-linked caterpillar 260 mm wide and a track pitch of one hundred millimeters.

Early T-60 tanks were equipped with light-signal communication between the crew, but this was abandoned very later. To fight fire - 2 tetrachlorine manual fire extinguisher.

Performance characteristics of T-60 tanks.

Performance characteristics of T-60 tanks

	T-60	reinforced armor
Length, mm.	4100	4100
Width, mm.	2290	2290
Height, mm.	1750	1750
Track, mm.	1660	1660
Track width, mm.	260	260
Combat weight, m.	5800	6200
Crew, people	2	2
Reservation, hull. mm/deg.
VLD	15/65	15/65
PLD	20/70	35/70
NLD	10/15	10/15
Boards	15/90	15/90
ON	13/76	15/76
NKL	13/30	25/30
Roof	13/0	15/0
Bottom	6-10/0	6-10/0
Reservation, tower. mm/deg.
Forehead	20/90	35/90
Boards	15/25	25/25
Stern	25/25	25/25
Armament	1x20-mm TNSh ob.1941

Light tank T-60

History of creation
In May 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 received the task of mastering the production of a modern light tank of the new generation T-50, designed in Leningrad at plant No. 174 named after Voroshilov. Having good characteristics, it was supposed to become the most popular in the tank forces of the Red Army, since due to its small size and moderate metal consumption (combat weight 14.5 tons), it could be mass-produced at a number of factories that were not capable of producing the T-34 medium tank. At the same time, it was planned to master the production of a rather complex and labor-intensive 6-cylinder diesel engine V-4 (“half” V-2).
The received task caused a shock among the plant management - his modest production capabilities clearly did not correspond to the new object. Suffice it to say that the T-50 had a complex planetary 8-speed gearbox, and gear cutting production has always been a weak point at this enterprise.

At the same time, the war quickly showed that mobile medium-armored vehicles of this class with light artillery weapons, which do not occupy the capacity of the main tank production, also have their own area of ​​application and are extremely necessary for the troops, given the catastrophic reduction in the tank fleet over the summer of 1941. Expanding the production of T-40 tanks as much as possible and slightly enhancing its armor protection, the workers of plant No. 37 came to the conclusion that it was possible to create a new light, no longer amphibious, but quite combat-ready tank for direct infantry support in the given conditions. In this case, it was assumed that the used engine-transmission unit and chassis of the T-40 would be used. The hull should have had a more rational shape, reduced dimensions and enhanced armor. This initiative work, which took place under the direct leadership of N.A. Astrov, was completed, starting in August 1941, in just 15 days. Literally under the bombing, a prototype of the new light tank 060 was designed and built.
Convinced of the feasibility and advantages of such a decision, chief designer N.A. Astrov, together with the senior military representative of the plant, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Okunev, wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which they substantiated the impossibility of producing the T-50 tank and, on the other hand, the reality of a rapid mastering the production of 060, and in mass quantities, with the widespread use of automobile units and advanced technologies for their manufacture. The letter, in accordance with the established procedure, was dropped in the evening into the mailbox at the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin, at night Stalin read it, and in the morning Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.A. Malyshev arrived at the plant, who was assigned to work on the new machine. He examined the 060 tank with interest, approved it, discussed technical and production problems with the designers and advised replacing the DShK machine gun with a much more powerful 20-mm ShVAK automatic cannon, well mastered in aviation, for which he immediately contacted N.A. Astrov with the OKB -15. This decision was formalized through the People's Commissariat of Armaments, which without delay announced a competition among the leading heavy machine-gun design bureaus for the creation of a rapid-fire 20-mm tank gun.
Already in the evening, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the adoption and urgent organization of mass production - up to 10,000 units per year - of a new vehicle, which received the army designation T-60 (in the beginning, the designations T-60SH - ShVAK were sometimes encountered). It was planned to use 5 plants of the People's Commissariat of Medium and Heavy Engineering: No. 37 (Moscow), GAZ (tank production - plant No. 176), Kolomna Locomotive Plant (KPZ) named after Kuibyshev, No. 264 (Krasnoarmeysky Shipyard near Stalingrad, which previously produced river armored boats of Project 1124) and the Kharkov Tractor Plant (KhTZ), which, unfortunately, quickly disappeared due to the urgent evacuation. Subsequently, they were joined by plants No. 38 in Kirov and No. 37 in Sverdlovsk. At the same time, the Moscow automobile plant KIM, the Krasny Proletary plant and the Mytishchi plant were involved in the production of tank units. machine-building plant No. 592 (chief designer G.I. Kashtanov).

Power units were to be supplied by GAZ. Armored hulls with turrets for plant No. 37 - Podolsk and Izhora plants, for GAZ - Vyksa and Murom, for KhTZ - Novokramatorsk machine-building plant, Voroshilovgrad locomotive-building plant and Mariupol metallurgical plant named after Ilyich (also quickly abandoned due to the occupation of the city).
Kolomna Plant, plants No. 38 and No. 264 could make them themselves. ShVAK air cannons came from the Kovrov plant No. 2 and from the Tula arms plant No. 535. From the end of 1942, the Mednogorsk plant No. 314 and the Kuibyshev plant No. 525 also began to supply them, but they made little - only 363 pieces. The production of openwork steel tracks for all factories was entrusted to the Dzerzhinsky Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ), which had a powerful shaped foundry.

Description of design
For the T-60 tank, designer A.B. Bogachev created a fundamentally new, more durable all-welded hull with a significantly smaller armored volume and a low silhouette - only 1360 mm high, with large angles of inclination of the front and rear sheets, made of rolled homogeneous 2P armor. The smaller dimensions of the hull made it possible to increase the thickness of all frontal sheets to 15 - 20 mm, and then to 20 - 35 mm, side sheets - up to 15 mm (later - up to 25 mm), aft - up to 13 mm (then in some places up to 25 mm). The angles of inclination of the armor plates to the vertical were: for the upper frontal plate - 70°, the lower frontal plate - 30°, the front plate of the driver's cabin - 25°, the sides of the turret - 25.5°, the upper aft - 69°, the lower aft - 32.5° .
The driver was located in the middle in a forward-facing wheelhouse with a frontal shield that could be folded down in a non-combat situation and an upper entrance hatch 10 mm thick (later 13 mm), the opening of which was less hampered by the directional position of the turret when the rifle mount was raised.The driver's viewing device - a quick-change mirror glass block "triplex" with a thickness of 36 mm was located in the frontal shield (initially and on the sides of the wheelhouse) behind a narrow gap covered by an armored flap.
The landing hatch was located in the 6-10 mm thick bottom. For external access to the engine and transmission units there was a removable front armor cover in an inclined frontal sheet, an upper side over-engine sheet with adjustable air flow and a rear aft one with exit blinds, which simultaneously covered two 320-liter gas tanks located in a compartment isolated by an armored partition. Two round hatches were used to refuel them. The turret sheet, 10 (13) mm thick, was also removable.

The new tower is only 375 mm high, designed by Yu.P. Yudovich, more technologically advanced than on the T-40, had a cone-shaped octagonal shape. It was welded from trapezoidal flat armor plates 25 mm thick, located at large angles of inclination, which significantly increased its resistance to fire. The thickness of the front zygomatic armor plates and weapon mantlet subsequently reached 35 mm. The 10-13 mm thick roof had a large commander's hatch with a round lid. In the side faces of the tower to the right and left of the shooter there were narrow slits equipped with two triplex-type viewing devices.
The turret was shifted to the left side by 285 mm from the hull axis. The guidance mechanisms of the rifle installation - horizontal gear and vertical screw (+27°...-7°), developed for the T-40, did not require changes. It should be noted that some armored hull factories, previously associated with boiler making, retained the production of round conical turrets for the T-60, similar to the T-40 turret.

On the second prototype of the T-60, instead of the DShK, they installed a rapid-firing 20-mm ShVAK-tank gun with a barrel length of 82.4 calibers, created in record time at OKB-15 together with OKB-16 based on the wing and turret versions of the ShVAK-20 air gun .Its design used an armament scheme developed at OKB-16 for the 37-mm NS-37 air cannon, and the barrel was borrowed from the MP-20 motor gun.
Refinement of the gun, including based on the results of front-line use, continued in parallel with the development of its production. Therefore, it was officially accepted into service only on December 1, and on January 1, 1942, it received the designation TNSh-1 (Tank Nudelman - Shpitapny) or TNSh-20, as it was called later. A version of the TNSh-2 with a higher shot power was also developed, but it was not brought to production.

For ease of aiming, the gun was placed in the turret with a significant offset from its axis to the right, which forced adjustments to be made to the readings of the TMFP-1 telescopic sight. The table range of a direct shot reached 2500 m, the sighting range was 7000 m, the rate of fire was up to 750 rounds/min, the mass of a second salvo of armor-piercing shells was 1.208 kg. With certain skills it was possible to conduct single shooting. The gun had a belt feed with a capacity of 754 shells (13 boxes). The ejection of spent cartridges from the turret was carried out through a gas outlet tube under the barrel armor, and the belt links were ejected along a guide on the bottom of the tank, while they scattered and were practically unable to jam the control system. The ammunition consisted of fragmentation tracer and fragmentation incendiary projectiles with an instantaneous fuse and armor-piercing incendiary projectiles with a tungsten carbide core and high initial speed Vo=815 m/s, which made it possible to effectively hit light and medium armored targets, as well as machine gun emplacements, anti-tank guns and enemy personnel. The subsequent introduction of a sub-caliber armor-piercing incendiary projectile increased armor penetration to 35 mm. As a result, the T-60 could fight at short distances with early German Pz.III and Pz.IV medium tanks when firing at the side, and at distances up to 1000 m - with armored personnel carriers and light self-propelled guns.
The ammunition load of the T-60 tank included 754 rounds for the gun (13 boxes of 58 rounds each) and 945 rounds for diesel fuel (15 discs). Boxes with shots for the TNSh were placed: a rack for 7 boxes in the fighting compartment, on the bottom, behind the driver’s seat - 1 box, at the gun - 1 box, on the left side - a rack for 4 boxes. DT discs were placed on the left side, above the rack with shots for the gun there was a cassette box for 12 discs, on the back of the driver's seat - 1 disc, on the first transverse beam of the hull above the driver - 1 disc, on the DT machine gun - 1 disc. On the first cross member of the hull there were grenade bags with 10 F-1 hand grenades.

It was not immediately possible to achieve trouble-free operation of the gun due to the misalignment of the projectiles and jamming of the tape in the feed sleeve.
This problem, under conditions of acute shortage of time, was dealt with at plant No. 37 by N.A. Astrov, N.A. Popov, A.A. Tarasov. We managed to solve it in just a few days. Tests of the improved ShVAK-tank gun on the T-60 in September 1941 were successful. In general, aircraft guns, which require cleanliness and proper maintenance, did not always work reliably in conditions of increased pollution and dust typical for tank operation.

To the left of the gun, in the same mount paired with it, there was a DT machine gun with 1008 rounds of ammunition (16 discs, later 15). It was possible to easily remove the machine gun and use it outside the tank with the bipod and shoulder rest attached. In combat practice, this situation often occurred. Basically in case urgent need It was also possible to remove the cannon, whose mass (68 kg) differed little from the common Maxim heavy machine gun, but rigidly securing it for firing outside the turret was difficult and therefore was not practiced.
The dimensions and design of the turret ring with a ball support on the T-60 did not undergo major changes, which made it possible to install it on the previously produced T-40 and T-30, and this was probably done in some cases.
In terms of armament and mobility, the T-60 tank generally corresponded to the German Pz.II, which was widely used at the beginning of the war, and the Luchs reconnaissance tank that appeared later, somewhat superior to them in armor protection, range and maneuverability on soft soils. Its armor was no longer only bulletproof, it provided protection at a distance of up to 500 m from shells from light infantry 75-mm guns, 7.92-mm and 14.5-mm anti-tank guns, 20-mm tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as 37-mm anti-tank guns, common in 1941 - 1942 in the Wehrmacht.
The dimensions of the body of the new vehicle did not change (length - 4100 mm, width at the track fingers - 2302 mm), while the gun did not protrude beyond its limits. The height was noticeably reduced - to 1735 mm, which reduced the silhouette of the tank and, accordingly, its vulnerability in battle. The base, track (2034 mm), ground clearance, caterpillar, chassis, suspension with balancers remained virtually unchanged. Subsequently, according to the conditions of unification and ease of repair, all torsion bars were made of the same diameter, which gradually increased to 34 mm with increasing loads. There were still no shock absorbers, longitudinal rocking remained, but combat operational experience revealed that it was significantly reduced when driving at high speeds, especially on rough terrain and on highways without deep potholes. So, speed once again came to the rescue of light tanks.

For production reasons, vehicles produced by the newly created tank factories were initially equipped with solid spoked road wheels, sometimes even without rubber bands.To make it easier to chip ice from the track tracks during winter operation, the rubber bands on the rear support rollers were eliminated. Then they were made without bandages at all - rubber became in short supply, and noise reduction was no longer a concern. A number of factories used solid-cast, non-separable drive sprockets with a reduced level of hardness - less durable, but more technologically advanced and cheaper. In war, their resources, as a rule, were quite sufficient. To prevent the tracks from jamming, which is especially dangerous when the track tension is weak on vehicles with front drive sprockets near the final drives, special bump stops were introduced - upper and lower.

The track rollers and idlers were made completely interchangeable - the losses from such unification, and they always exist, were less than from difficulties with supply. In the spring of 1942, angular contact ball bearings for road wheels and sloths were replaced with conventional radial ones. Although they turned out to be 25 - 45% less durable, they did not require adjustment, which is difficult to implement in front-line conditions. Such a replacement most likely caused disappointment among the designers, but such is the ruthless demand of the war or one of its lessons - to do without excesses even at the expense of durability. By the way, since then only non-adjustable bearing units have been used in rollers, and their acceptable durability is maintained by increasing the size of the supports.

On the T-60, as on the T-30, the control of the onboard clutches and their maintenance were made easier: instead of cam shifters, ball ones were introduced - the famous “tear drops”, as on the T-34. Radio stations were not installed on all series of cars; the first ones did not have them at all. Internal communication was carried out using TPU-2 or signal lamps.

Engine GAZ-202 with a power of 76 hp. at 3400 rpm, with a cast iron cylinder head and a compression ratio of 5.6, it no longer had the same high parameters as the GAZ-11 A, but became more reliable and durable - failures of its asymmetrical connecting rod bearings and breakdown of the cylinder head gasket were not observed . He withstood short-term work without any special consequences at a job that was more common in the army and not so scarce in wartime. automobile gasoline 2nd grade. Only updraft carburetors were installed on the engine - usually one or even two M-9510 from GAZ-M-1 or one MKZ-6 from ZIS-5, and later a specially created K-43 with a rev limiter. The power of the G-41 generator was increased to 200 W, although in the first series of tanks without a radio, they had to be content with a standard car generator with a power of 100 W. But two batteries - the main one and the spare one - became standard equipment on all tanks, even non-radio equipped ones. This increased their constant readiness for battle.

The belt drive of the fan and water pump was strengthened, but its reliability still remained unsatisfactory, given high temperature in the engine compartment and a constant threat of fire. There was no doubt that this measure was temporary and required radical revision. Later, a more reliable gear fan drive was introduced, however, already on the following light tracked vehicles.
It was also possible to solve the problem of manually starting the engine. Through a hatch in the front lower armor plate, the crank was inserted into the starting shaft ratchet, which turned the engine using a cardan drive and a manual winding mechanism mounted on the gearbox housing. The mechanism was turned on forcibly by a lever, and after starting it turned off automatically. Subsequently, this proven system was used on other light tracked armored vehicles.
Winter engine starting was greatly facilitated by preliminary dilution of the oil with fuel in an amount of 12.5% ​​and the use of PKB and PGB starting gasoline, as in aviation.
Two gas tanks with a total capacity of 320 liters were located on the left side of the aft compartment of the hull in a compartment isolated by armored partitions. A fan and radiator for the engine cooling system with a capacity of 38 liters were mounted to the right of the gas tanks.
The mechanical transmission consisted of a main dry friction clutch, a four-speed automotive-type gearbox providing four forward and one reverse gears, a main gear with a bevel gear, two multi-disc dry side clutches (steel on steel) with band brakes with ferrodo linings and two simple single-row final drives.
The chassis used a torsion bar independent suspension, consisting of 4 road wheels (on board), as well as three support rollers, drive (front-mounted) and idler wheels. Some of the vehicles from factories No. 37, 38 and 264 had cast spoked ones instead of welded-stamped road wheels and idlers, and a small number of T-60s from factory No. 264 were equipped with cast metal rollers with internal shock absorption. There were several options for support rollers (with and without rubber), as well as sloths. The vehicle was equipped with a cast small-link caterpillar 260 mm wide with a track pitch of 100 mm.
The electrical equipment of the T-60 was made according to a single-wire circuit with an on-board network voltage of 6 V. Two ZSTE-112 batteries connected in series with a voltage of 6 V and a capacity of 112 Ah and a G-41 generator were used as sources of electricity.
On the first production vehicles there was a light signal connection between the commander and the driver, but it was quickly abandoned. Two hand-held tetrachlorine fire extinguishers located inside the tank were used as fire-fighting equipment.

Compared to the T-40, the combat weight of the T-60 increased slightly - first to 5800 kg, and after strengthening the armor from October 1941 - to 6400 kg. True, this circumstance, as well as the installation of an unboosted engine, noticeably reduced the specific power of the tank: the maximum speed decreased to 44 km/h, the maximum climbable grade was reduced to 29.5°, and after increasing the mass, to 26°.
However, this was enough. In general, the average speeds in various conditions did not decrease, as did the maneuverability and parameters of profile cross-country ability: ditch width - 1.7 m, wall height - 0.65 m, ford depth - 0.9 m, permissible roll - 35°. The range has increased noticeably: on the highway - up to 455 km, on the ground - up to 350 km, on heavy off-road - up to 160 km. The specific pressure on the ground increased, but only slightly - to 0.485 (for vehicles with reinforced armor - up to 0.535) kg/cm2 without taking into account the immersion of the tracks, taking into account the immersion - up to 0.4 (0.44) kg/cm2. Subsequently, to improve cross-country ability on marshy soils and snow, removable stamped track extensions were used, mass production of which began in 1942. Of all domestic tanks at that time, the T-60 had the best cross-country ability - on swampy ground, snow, wet meadows, and in spring thaw. The warranty period was determined to be 1000 km. The initial overheating of the engine, located in a reduced engine compartment, was eliminated by improving the aerodynamics of the heated air exiting the radiator through bulletproof shutters due to the introduction of curved guides - “Prandtl blades”.

It is interesting that I.V. came to briefly test the second prototype of the T-60 (already with a cannon). Stalin. After which intensive preparations immediately began for the production of the tank at all of the specified factories, where duplicates of technical documentation were urgently sent. On its own initiative, the Moscow Automobile Plant named after. Stalin (ZIS), where leading designers B.M. Fitterman and A.M. Avenarius created a similar tank ZIS-60, which differed from the T-60 by a new turret design, a different installation of weapons and the use of a ZIS-16 bus power unit with a power of 88 hp, much heavier and bulkier than the GAZ-202, but generally compatible in a slightly enlarged body. These hulls with turrets also began to be made in Podolsk, and before the evacuation of the ZIS, which began on October 16, 1941, at least 10 sets of them were delivered.

Tank production
The idea of ​​mass production in non-specialized enterprises is extremely simple lung a tank with an automobile power unit seemed so attractive that a proposal to produce an improved T-60 project was made by machine tool plant No. 301 "Komsomolets" in Yegoryevsk, well equipped for the manufacture of various gearboxes, drives, rollers and suspension elements. However, for a number of reasons this initiative was not implemented. And at the main plant No. 37 for the expanded production of the T-60, a conveyor was urgently installed, technological equipment was being prepared, and an overpass was being built for receiving armored hulls.
Since the GAZ-202 power units were sorely lacking, in October 1941, People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V.A. Malyshev allowed the T-60 to be equipped with any engines suitable in terms of power and dimensions.
This probably explains the presence in the troops of individual vehicles with abnormal power plants, most often with Ford V-8 engines with a power of 65 and 90 hp, which before the war were imported in significant quantities and installed mainly on GAZ-M-1 cars special purpose. In extreme cases, it was possible to install, including in the troops, a low-power GAZ-M power unit, but with a great loss for the T-60 in dynamics, as well as other more or less suitable automobile engines.
Only during the war years was it truly possible to appreciate the reasonableness and foresight of the designers, who at the end of the 20s laid down large, and for peacetime, even excess capacity in the tool, machine tool and stamping production of the automobile plant, in the size of the assembly buildings with their obviously disproportionate crane facilities , into inter-shop concrete coverings capable of withstanding heavy tank traffic. It is worth recalling that before this, the plant had already allocated several of the best, with the latest equipment, buildings for the organization of aircraft engine manufacturing (plant No. 466), as well as the production of mortars, various projectiles and aircraft launch radio stations.

Meanwhile, Moscow plant No. 37 produced the first production T-60 on September 15, 1941, but due to the evacuation that soon followed (order dated October 9), production was stopped on October 26. In total, 245 T-60 tanks were made in Moscow. Instead of Tashkent, which was initially planned, the plant was evacuated to Sverdlovsk: on the territory of the Metalist plant, the Voevodin car repair plant and the Uralmash branch - to a total of three industrial sites, where the equipment arrived from October 28 to November 6. Together with part of the KIM plant evacuated there, a new tank plant No. 37 was formed (chief designer G.S. Surenyan, then N.A. Popov). Assembled on it since December 15, 1941, mainly from parts brought from Moscow, the first 20 T-30 and T-60 tanks marched through the streets of Sverdlovsk on January 1, 1942, having previously fired their weapons at a specially built training ground. During the first quarter of 1942, 512 vehicles were already produced. Wanting to contribute to improving the design of the T-60 tank, in particular, to increase its mobility on the ground, and in accordance with the government’s instructions, in February 1942, Sverdlovsk residents built and tested a sample of the improved model T-60-1 (061 or T-60- ZIS) with the ZIS-60 power unit increased to 95 hp. (in the future - up to 110 hp) power. It was planned to involve the nearby Miass Automotive Plant, which was being completed at that time, in its production. In total, until September 1942, 1144 T-60s were produced in the Urals, after which Plant No. 37, briefly producing the T-70 tank, stopped independent tank building, switching to the production of components and assemblies for the T-34 tank, as well as ammunition.

Tank production, plant No. 38, deployed in Kirov on the territory of the crane plant "Imeni 1 Maya" (chief designer - hereditary "steam locomotive" M.N. Shchukin) - produced the first five T-60s already in January 1942.
Since February, the plant began their planned production, while simultaneously supplying other enterprises with cast track tracks, which were previously made only by STZ. During the first quarter, 241 vehicles were produced, by June - 535. How important the T-60 light tanks became for arming the Red Army is evidenced by a telegram to the plant from the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin with a request to exceed the September 1942 program by at least 25 vehicles due to the cessation of production of T-34 tanks at STZ. And in the summer of the same year, for the successful development of T-60 production, plant No. 38 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Insufficiently equipped, located on clearly small production areas (only 21.3 hectares) of the old enterprise, the plant compensated for this by introducing very effective methods work, the creation of ingenious high-performance welding jigs and devices for high-speed machining of housings. There were even opportunities to conduct experiments with the production of prototypes - and this was in the most difficult second year of the war. And later the company made a significant contribution to the creation of new models of armored vehicles. Tank designers from the former Sverdlovsk plant No. 37 (since September 1943 - plant No. 50) moved to its territory at the end of 1942. In addition, mass production of rocket artillery mounts mounted on imported automobile chassis continued here, which also required serious design support.

Another enterprise involved in the production of the T-60, Krasnoarmeysk Plant No. 264, received technical documentation for the tank in a timely manner, but subsequently drove the vehicle independently, without resorting to the help of the parent plant, but also without trying to modernize it. On September 16, 1941, it was joined by workers from the evacuated KhTZ, who were familiar with tank building, and who, while still in Kharkov, began mastering the production of the T-60 (the leading designer for product 060 at KhTZ was A.G. Dombrovsky). They arrived at plant No. 264 with a backlog of tools, patterns, stamps and tank blanks already prepared, so the first armored hull was welded by September 29th. The transmission and chassis units were to be supplied by the STZ tank production (plant No. 76). Extremely loaded with the production of the T-34 and V-2 diesel engines, which also turned out to be their only manufacturer at the end of 1941, STZ and plant No. 264, which supplied it with armored hulls and welded turrets for the “thirty-four”, could not give the light T-60 the same attention. Nevertheless, in December we managed to assemble the first 52 cars. In January 1942, 102 tanks were already delivered, and in the first quarter - 249. In total, by June 1942, 830 T-60s were produced. A significant part of them took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, especially in its initial phase. Plant No. 264 tried to install turrets with weapons from the T-60 on its armored boats. It is known that back in 1946, there was one T-60 on the territory of the plant, which was never submitted to military acceptance.
The head and the most large plant production of the T-60 became GAZ, where on October 16, 1941 permanent job H.A. arrived Astrov with a small group of Moscow colleagues (the main team went to Sverdlovsk) to provide design support for production. He was soon appointed deputy chief designer of the tank building plant, and at the beginning of 1942 he received the Stalin Prize for the creation of the T-40 and T-60.

The Gorky factories "Engine of Revolution" and milling machines (during the war - No. 113) joined in the production of chassis units. Since the first one disrupted the development of final drive production, GAZ again took over their production. Typically, such work took at least six months, but here, in just 10 days, models and dies of gearbox housings, welding jigs, non-standard spline broaches, modular cutters, measuring and control tools were made. Automobile manufacturers rationally and efficiently solved the complex problem of mass production of track tracks 060 - 142510-A from almost unprocessable G13L steel - hot stamping with subsequent stitching of holes for connecting pins in a still heated part. And this is with a daily production of at least 4 thousand pieces! Other factories were unable to master such advanced technology.
However, despite all the gigantic efforts and energetic measures taken, the inertia of the huge enterprise with its inevitably careful technological training mass production hampered the rapid return to a stable production rhythm - only 3 tanks were produced in September. And in October there remained a significant lag behind schedule.

In 1942, despite the creation and adoption of the more combat-ready light tank T-70, parallel production of the T-60 continued at GAZ - until April (in total for 1942 - 1639 vehicles), at the Sverdlovsk plant No. 37 - until August , at plant No. 38 - until July. In 1942, all factories produced 4,164 tanks. Plant No. 37 delivered the last 55 vehicles at the beginning of 1943 (until February). In total, since 1941, 5839 T-60s have been produced “by assembly”, the army has accepted 5796 vehicles “by battle”. TNSh-20 guns were produced for them with a large supply: in 1942 - 8506, in 1943 - another 200.

Attempts at modernization
During serial production of the T-60, attempts were made repeatedly to improve the characteristics of the tank - everyone was well aware that its combat value was very low. So, back in August 1941, the design bureau of plant No. 92 in Gorky, on its own initiative, began designing the ZIS-19 gun, intended to arm the T-60 tank.
It was a 37-mm gun with a 66.7-caliber barrel, a muzzle velocity of 915 m/s and the ballistics of a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model. The ammunition used was the same as in the anti-aircraft gun. In October, development of the ZIS-19BM variant began here - a 45-mm gun of 46 calibers with an initial speed of 757 m/s, which was a modernization of the 45-mm 20-K gun.
In December 1941, Plant No. 92 received the T-60 tank at its disposal. In the shortest possible time - from December 20, 1941 to January 13, 1942 - plant No. 92 developed the final drawings of the installation, and in just a week - from January 12 to 19 - the ZIS-19 was manufactured in metal and mounted in the T-60 turret.

After the gun was finalized in April - May 1942, comparative field tests of the second version of the ZIS-19 in the T-60 and the 45-mm tank gun of the 1938 model in the production T-70 tank were carried out. According to the results (826 shots were fired from the ZIS-19), it was noted that the accuracy of the gun at a distance of 2000 meters was unsatisfactory, at 1000 and 500 m it was better than the table for a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun (the ZIS-19 had the ballistics of a 37-mm gun of the 1939 model) . A good rate of fire was obtained - up to 10 rounds per minute without aiming correction and 6-7 shots with correction. At the same time, the ZIS-19 showed low barrel survivability, as well as a number of shortcomings in the operation of the striking mechanism and knurl. In addition, it was extremely difficult to fire from the ZIS-19 mounted in the T-60 due to the cramped turret and poor placement of the aiming mechanisms. The conclusion noted that the ZIS-19 did not pass the tests, and it was recommended that plant No. 92 eliminate the identified defects. After this, it was proposed to test the gun in the T-70 turret, where it would have “an incomparable advantage over the 45-mm tank gun mod. 1938 in the convenience of combat service, rate of fire, supply of combat kit and cost-effectiveness of manufacturing.” But further work on the ZIS-19 was stopped.

There were attempts to strengthen the armament of the “sixty” at other factories. For example, the Gorky Automobile Plant produced a T-60 tank with a 45-mm cannon installed in a new turret, but on an old shoulder strap. At the end of 1941, a prototype was made and tested by fire, after which it was ordered similar car made of armor steel. However, in connection with work on the T-70, further work on installing a 45-mm gun in the T-60 at GAZ was stopped.
Due to the introduction of shielded hulls and hulls with thicker armor (20-35 mm) into the series, the weight of T-60 tanks increased, which led to a deterioration in the dynamic characteristics of the vehicle.

May 26, 1942 chief engineer Plant No. 37, Martirosov reported to the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. Malyshev that the tests of T-60 tanks with ZIS-16 engines with a power of 85 hp. and ZIS-5 at 73 hp. carried out.
According to the results, the best results were shown by the vehicle with the ZIS-16, however, as a temporary measure, until the ZIS-16 was received, it was considered possible to install a ZIS-5 engine on the T-60.

Simultaneously with testing the ZIS engines, the design bureau of plant No. 37 quickly developed a project for a new tank, designated T-45. The vehicle, based on the T-60, was offered as an alternative to the T-70 from the GAZ plant. However, further work on the T-45 tank was stopped - according to GAZ designers, at that time they were finishing the design of the T-70 version with a double turret, which the military preferred.

Mention should be made of the M-8 rocket launchers, manufactured on the basis of the T-30 and T-60 tanks. The first such machine was manufactured by the Kompressor plant in August 1941, after which small-scale production began. In 1941, 7 T-30 and 137 T-60 were transferred for these purposes, and in 1942 - another 35. These vehicles were combined into separate guards mortar divisions, and in 1942 they were included in the newly formed tank corps.

To significantly increase the firepower of the T-60, in particular, to increase the armor penetration of its most widely used shells (scarce sub-caliber shells were rarely used and were effective only at close ranges), the idea arose to equip the tank with a 23-mm VYa air cannon with a muzzle energy 2.52 times greater, than that of TNSh-20. The mass of a second salvo increased to 2 kg/s. The range of shots also included fragmentation shells. The VYa cannon reliably hit medium-armored targets at a greater distance than the TNSh-20.
Based on the wing and turret versions of the VYA cannon, Plant No. 2 in the third quarter of 1942 produced 16 23-mm automatic tank guns, which it modified together with OKB-16 for installation on the T-60. At the same time, in order to reduce the waste of ammunition, a disconnector was introduced into the design to allow single firing in self-cocking mode. The use of a VYa cannon, more powerful and reliable than the TNSh-20, would probably give a positive result, but evidence of its installation on the T-60 tank has not yet been found.
To protect against flammable mixture bottles, which the Germans began to widely use in the winter of 1942, it was proposed to cover the hull of the T-60 tank with a double Davy mesh, which serves as a kind of screen. Tests of such protection near Chkalov (Orenburg) at the end of February 1942 gave good results. Due to the technical difficulties of equipping the tank with the Davy mesh, it was practically not used in front-line conditions.

The T-60 tank turned out to be an excellent base for carrying out various experimental work and creating new combat modifications based on it.For air defense of tank formations and installations, as well as headquarters, an armored anti-aircraft machine gun mount was required, the mobility of which would not be inferior to tanks. Therefore, at the very end of 1942, the Gorky Automobile Plant, on its own initiative, built a tank 063 or T-60-3 (3 - modification, not z - anti-aircraft) with a coaxial installation of two DShK anti-aircraft machine guns in an open turret of increased dimensions. Since the factory was unable to produce the gear ring of the turret ring with the accuracy required for anti-aircraft shooting, the tank was not accepted for service, although the need for such a product remained very urgent and part of the vacant fleet of T-60 tanks could be used for it. Moreover, with the deployment of counter-offensives in 1943, it could bring tangible benefits in urban battles.
On the experimental GAZ T-95 tank, also made on the basis of the “sixties”, they tried another option for installing the same anti-aircraft weapons and sights, but this vehicle was not produced for a number of reasons. Plant No. 37 carried out similar work, building in July 1942, on instructions from the Main Artillery Directorate, the ZSU-37 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft installation based on the T-60. Due to the insufficient rigidity of the hull and the support of the turntable, it also turned out to be unsuccessful and was not adopted for service. An attempt to create an open self-propelled artillery mount with a 45-mm M-42 anti-tank gun did not produce the expected results. At Plant No. 38 they designed and by the summer of 1944 built the 76-mm open artillery combined arms self-propelled gun OSU-76 - in theory, an extremely light and cheap self-propelled gun for direct infantry support. It used the ZIS-Z divisional gun of the 1942 model, and the transmission and chassis (with a rear drive sprocket) from the T-60 tank. The shortage of 6-cylinder engines caused the installation of the old 4-cylinder GAZ-M on it, which predetermined low specific power and, accordingly, poor mobility of the vehicle.
To reduce weight, the gun was covered only in front and partially on the sides with bulletproof armor only 6 mm thick.
The installation turned out to be unstable when fired - the high height of the line of fire with a short base of four road wheels affected it, although from the experience of the SU-76M it was known that this gun required six rollers, the low mass of the vehicle - 4.2 tons and the position of the gun being asymmetrical relative to the axis. Production of OSU-76 was planned in 1944 (plan for the third quarter - 129 vehicles) at Leningrad plant No. 7 together with plant No. 38, a supplier of chassis and transmission units. However, due to its low combat qualities, it was not accepted, and in 1944, when the troops already had more successful SU-76M installations, it was not needed. Nevertheless, in the airborne version, the OSU-76 installation was of certain interest as the lightest for the 76 mm caliber, and its insufficient stability and accuracy when firing in such an extremely simple design were tolerable.

It must be admitted that on the basis of the T-60 tank, a full-fledged self-propelled gun with a caliber of over 45 mm did not work out. In February 1942, a certain Mashnev proposed a curious - there is no other way to say it - project of a two-seater “armored wedge-motorcycle” with 15 mm armor, two DT machine guns, two motorcycle engines, with suspension and road wheels from the T-60. It was rejected as untenable.
To improve the generally good maneuverability of the T-60 tank in snow, GAZ decided to extremely reduce the specific pressure on the surface and make it more uniform. For this, in the winter of 1942, under the leadership of H.A. Astrov with the participation of V.K. Rubtsova and S.S. Stroev, on one of the samples, put on board 8 small-diameter road wheels from an electric car, connected in pairs by rigid balancers to the levers of four suspension bogies. We used a new caterpillar with maximally widened tracks at twice the normal pitch. The result turned out to be good - cross-country ability in snow improved dramatically, but mechanical losses and vibrations increased, and the engine power was not enough for confident movement. The highest maneuverability in snow of any depth of density was shown by the experimental T-60 with the ski-tracked propulsion system of the S.S. system. Nezhdanovsky, also built in the winter of 1942.
We also tried on the T-60 a snowmobile propulsion system with support skids instead of road wheels, which would give an ideal loading diagram for the tracks. The car also ran well, but with large losses in self-propulsion - there was not enough engine power.

For the transfer of light tanks as part of landing forces behind enemy lines, as well as for supplying large partisan detachments with them, the designer of light aviation
O.K. Antonov proposed in the fall of 1941 to build a simplified towed glider for one-time use, the body of the T-60 tank would be used as the fuselage, and its chassis would be used as a takeoff and landing device. It was assumed that such a combined glider could be towed by a four-engine TB-3 bomber or a DB-ZF aircraft to its destination, and after disengagement, land on an area of ​​​​limited dimensions, drop the wings with the tail and go straight into battle.
Similar task aircraft, which had no analogues in history, O.K. Antonov, supported by the head of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the GBTU, General S.A. Afonin, received it at the end of 1941. The machine was designed in just two weeks and by the summer of 1942 it was built at the glider plant in Tyumen. It was called KT (“Tank Wings”), and was also designated A-T indices, AT-1 or A-40 airframe.
The wings with a span of 18 m and a double-boom tail were made according to a biplane design to reduce the size of the airframe - its length was only 12.06 m. The cable control was brought to the place of the tank driver, additionally equipped with side and side mirrors. rear views. The vehicle itself was extremely lightened (to a weight of 5800 kg), removing weapons, ammunition, headlights, wings and draining almost all the fuel. The flight weight of the glider tank was 7804 kg, the specific wing load was only 91 kg/m 2.
A test flight in the fall of 1942 in tow from a TB-3 (glider pilot, also a mechanic - test pilot S.N. Anokhin) showed that the idea of ​​a flying light tank was feasible and feasible. However, due to the high aerodynamic drag of the KT airframe, which did not yet have fairings, towing required the use of maximum power from already worn-out TB-3 engines, which began to heat up - the airframe had to be unhooked in an emergency. Surprisingly, he planned well and successfully landed on a hummocky field in the area of ​​the Ramenskoye airfield, causing panic among the anti-aircraft gunners and the unwarned team of the airfield service battalion. Having dropped its wings, the T-60 safely returned to its base in Monino under its own power. Due to the lack of other bombers suitable for this purpose, the best of which would be the Pe-8, this interesting work had no further continuation.

Combat use
T-60 tanks received their baptism of fire at the end of September 1941, when they fought heavy battles in the Poltava region as part of the 10th Tank Brigade. They were used in large quantities in the battle for Moscow. They were available in almost all tank brigades and many individual tank battalions. 48 T-60s taken from the reserve took part in the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. After the parade they all went to the front. These were Moscow-made tanks; Gorky's T-60s first entered battle near Moscow only on December 13th. The role of the “sixties” in the Battle of Moscow turned out to be great, since the production of medium and heavy tanks in October-November 1941 fell to the lowest level for the entire Great Patriotic War, because almost all tank factories were “on wheels”, on the way to the East.
T-60s began arriving on the Leningrad Front in the spring of 1942, when the Headquarters allocated 60 vehicles with crews to form the 61st Tank Brigade.
The story of their delivery to the besieged city is not without interest. They decided to transport the tanks on barges with coal. It was good from a camouflage point of view. The barges delivered fuel to Leningrad, became familiar to the enemy, and not every time they were actively hunted. In addition, coal as ballast provided river vessels with the necessary stability.
Combat vehicles were loaded from the pier above the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Log decks were laid over the coal, tanks were placed on them, and barges set sail from the shore. Enemy aircraft were never able to detect the movement of our military unit.
The baptism of fire of the 61st Tank Brigade occurred on January 12, 1943 - the first day of the operation to break the siege of Leningrad. Moreover, the brigade, like the 86th and 118th tank battalions, which were also armed with light tanks, operated in the first echelon of the 67th Army and crossed the Neva across the ice. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks were brought into battle only on the second day of the offensive, after a bridgehead 2-3 km deep was captured and sappers strengthened the ice.
The T-60 crew, which included the company commander of the 61st Tank Brigade, Lieutenant D.I. Osatyuk, showed particular courage, heroism and resourcefulness during the offensive, and the driver was Sergeant Major I.M. Makarenkov. This is how this episode is described in the collection “Tankmen in the Battle of Leningrad”: “Having rushed forward at dawn on January 18 near Workers’ Village No. 5, they noticed three tanks. The Volkhovites wanted to jump out of the car and run towards them, but... they saw that it was Hitler’s tanks going on a counterattack. What to do? It is pointless to start a duel with the enemy on your little one, which has a 20-mm cannon... The decision was made instantly! The tank commander gave a command to the driver: “Retreat to that grove, on the edge of which our guns took up firing positions!”

The tank, maneuvering, making unexpected and sharp turns, eluded the fire of Nazi tanks. And Osatyuk fired at them, trying to blind and stun the enemy. The duel lasted several minutes. There were moments when it seemed that the armored monsters were about to overtake, fall upon and crush. When there were about 200 meters left to the grove, Osatyuk’s car turned sharply to the left. The lead Nazi tank also turned around, but came under fire from our guns and burst into flames. Then the second tank was hit, and the third left the battlefield.
“Now, Vanyusha, go ahead!” - the commander ordered the driver. Having caught up with their company, they saw an interesting picture - the tankers had driven the enemy infantry into a huge pit. The Nazis stubbornly resisted and threw grenades at our tanks. It was clear that there was no time to delay: the Nazis would have time to dig in. Osatyuk orders Makarenkov to make a trail to the cliff and lay a track. Then the tank, picking up speed, rushed towards the pit, flew through the air and crashed into the Nazis.
"Well done! - the lieutenant shouted. - Now act! The car rushed at high speed along the bottom of the pit, destroying the Nazis with fire and tracks. After making several circles, the tank slowed down, reached the middle of the pit and stopped. It was all over. Your guys came..."

This combat episode perfectly illustrates the old tanker truth - the indestructibility of a tank is proportional to the square of its speed.
However, measures were taken to strengthen the armor protection of the tank. At the suggestion of the Izhora armored NII-48, transferred at the beginning of the war from the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry to tank building, several options for installing additional armored screens up to 10 mm thick on the front of the hull and on the turret of the T-60 tank were developed and implemented on many vehicles.

As for the 61st Tank Brigade, its tanks were the first to link up with the troops of the Volkhov Front. For its excellent combat operations, it was transformed into the 30th Guards. Lieutenant D.I. Osatyuk and driver-mechanic foreman I.M. Makarenkov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
T-60s also fought on the Southern Front, especially in the spring of 1942 in the Crimea, participated in the Kharkov operation, in the defense of Stalingrad and in the counter-offensive of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts in the winter of 1942/43. The Germans called the T-60 “indestructible locusts” and were forced to reckon with them.
T-60s made up a significant part of the combat vehicles of the 1st Tank Corps (commander - Major General M.E. Katukov), together with other formations of the Bryansk Front, repelled the German offensive in the Voronezh direction in the summer of 1942. During the fighting, Katukov's corps, which formed a single battle group with the 16th Tank Corps, found itself in a difficult situation. This is how M.E. Katukov himself describes this situation and the actions of the T-60 tanks:
“The Nazis, conducting continuous attacks, sought to find the most vulnerable spots in the groups’ battle formations. Finally they managed to do it. In a sector where we had few fire weapons, the fascist infantry broke through the front line and penetrated our defenses. The situation has become threatening. Having made a breach, the Nazis continued to deepen the breakthrough in order to separate the group’s troops and reach their rear.
It should also be taken into account that at that moment the enemy was pressing along the entire front line, which means that all the available forces of our group - tanks and infantry - were fully involved. In my reserve there were two light T-60 tanks. But these “baby” combat vehicles could only be called tanks conditionally. They were armed with 20-mm ShVAK cannons.
The reader probably has an idea of ​​what a twelve-gauge hunting shotgun is. So the guns in service with the T-60 have the same caliber. The T-60s were not suitable for fighting against German tanks. But the “little ones” acted excellently against enemy manpower and more than once inflicted enormous damage on the fascist infantry with their automatic fire. This happened both near Mtsensk and near Moscow.
And now, in the fateful hour of the German breakthrough, the “baby” tanks came to the rescue.When the fascist infantry penetrated our defenses for half a kilometer, if not more, I threw my last reserve into battle.
Fortunately, the rye at that time rose almost as tall as a man, and this helped the “little ones,” hiding in the rye, to go to the rear of the Nazis who had infiltrated our battle formations. T-60s attacked the German infantry with heavy fire from a short distance. Several minutes passed, and the chains of the advancing fascists were thrown back.”

The 91st Tank Brigade, one battalion of which was armed with T-60 tanks, also took part in the fierce battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad in September 1942. At the same time, small cars bore such impressive names as “Terrible”, “Eagle”, “Brave”.
The Battle of Stalingrad and the breaking of the siege of Leningrad became the apogee of the combat career of the “sixties”. Already from the end of 1942 combat use The T-60 at the forefront began to run out, and production was winding down. They honestly and selflessly completed their task, to a certain extent closing the gap caused by the acute shortage of medium tanks, but they could no longer resist the increased anti-tank defenses of the Germans.
To be fair, it must be admitted that the tankers were not particularly fond of these relatively lightly armored and weakly armed (for 1942) vehicles with fire-hazardous gasoline engines, calling them BM-2 - “mass grave for two.”
The last major operation in which they were used was the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in January 1944. Thus, among the 88 tanks of the 1st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front there were 21 T-60 tanks, in the 220th Tank Brigade there were 18, and in the 124th Tank Regiment of the Volkhov Front, at the start of the operation on January 16, 1944, only 10 combat vehicles: two T-34s, two T-70s, five T-60s and even one T-40!

Subsequently, the use of the T-60 continued as vehicles for escorting troops on the march, guarding and communicating, for reconnaissance in force, combating landings, as artillery tractors for towing ZIS-2 anti-tank guns and divisional ZIS-Z, as command and training tanks.
In this form, the T-60s were used in the active army until the end Patriotic War, and as artillery tractors - also in the war with Japan.

T-60 tanks, besides the Red Army, were found only in the Polish Army (3 units in 1945). Unfortunately, quite a few cars were captured. The Germans most often used them as high-speed armored tractors for anti-tank artillery, sometimes without turrets.
They handed over a number of captured T-60s to their ally, Romania. There, on their basis, they built a batch of quite successful TAKAM self-propelled artillery units with the Soviet 76.2 mm F-22 cannon, located in an open wheelhouse. The armored hull and chassis did not cause any complaints and were left unchanged, with the exception of increasing the stiffness of the suspension. There is information about the construction by the Romanians of two more types of closed artillery installations, including one with a 105-mm howitzer, on the chassis of the T-60 tank.

At the end of the war, the surviving T-60s were quickly written off. Only one full-fledged copy has survived in the Museum of Armored Vehicles in Kubinka and a full-scale copy (external only), made in the late 60s, in the museum of the Vyksa DRO plant.
Since March 1947, the Leningrad Defense Museum has exhibited the T-60 tank No. 164 from the Lenfront, in which Lieutenant D.I. Osatyuk, described above, was one of the first to make his way to the mainland when breaking the blockade in January 1943.
Subsequently, during the liquidation of the museum in the 50s, tank No. 164 disappeared without a trace. One “sixtieth” in good condition, but without the ShVAK cannon, is kept in the tank museum in Parola (Finland). Probably the only T-60 tank monument is located in the village of Gluboky, Rostov region.

This vehicle was captured on film less than others - it was not often filmed at the front. A rare document was the footage of the T-60 unit entering the liberated Volokolamsk in December 1941 (operators G.M. Bobrov and R.L. Carmen). However, training T-60s often “played” German tanks in feature films created during the war: for example, “Two Soldiers” and “She Defends the Motherland” (both 1943). The speed and maneuverability of the vehicle, its small size, and thin long-barreled gun are clearly visible on the screen. This is how everyone remembers her...

Sources

• Maxim Kolomiets Great Patriotic Suicide Tanks T-30, T-60, T-70
• Armor collection E.I. Prochko Light tanks T-40 and T-60 No. 4 (13) “1997.
• Baryatinsky M. - Light tanks of World War II - 2007

Light tank T 60 photo , only replaced the T-50, adopted on April 16, 1941, which was mastered by our production with great difficulty. Why did this happen? On June 25, 1941, a decree was issued, plant No. 37 should stop assembling T-40 tanks and immediately begin manufacturing the T-50. However, the plant’s capabilities were absolutely unsuitable for the production of a combat vehicle of this degree of complexity; let me remind you that only imported bearings were used for production. The nomenclature and standard size of most T-50 parts did not correspond to similar elements of light tanks (“light” in name, but “small” in essence) manufactured at Plant No. 37. Increase production areas, strengthening the load-bearing structures of the workshops, re-equipping the machine park, and reconstructing the enterprise in Moscow under military conditions was absolutely futile.

Small amphibious tank T-38 and light T-40 photo from the stern

N.A. Astrov (chief designer of the T-40, by the way, the famous “Shilka” was also made with his participation, as well as the “Buk”), began to urgently design light tank T 60 photo using the main components and assemblies of the serial T-40. By abandoning the buoyancy of the T-40, it was planned to significantly strengthen the armament and armor.

• In two weeks (!) the project of the new light tank was completed. At the same time, in the experimental workshop under the supervision of master G.F. Antonov collected the first sample.
• It was equipped with a 20-mm TNSh automatic cannon, coaxial with a DT machine gun. The gun for it was converted from an aviation ShVAK and was already put into service in September.
• Weighing 68 kilograms, almost the same as a Maxim machine gun with a machine gun. Ammunition 13 boxes (754 rounds), belt fed, rate of fire up to 750 rounds. The cannon's armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile had a high initial speed of 815 m/s. This allowed light tank T 60 photo at short distances it successfully fought against early Wehrmacht tanks when firing at the side, penetrating up to 35 mm. Armored personnel carriers and light self-propelled guns were accessible to destruction at a distance of up to 1 km.
• The layout was basically similar to that of the T-40. A cutting was made in the upper frontal plate in the area of ​​the driver's seat. In the middle frontal plate on the right, for access to the main gear of the transmission, there was a rectangular hatch with a cover secured with bolts. In the lower frontal plate there was a hole for the engine crank, covered with an armored cover. The octagonal turret was moved to the left side. The thickness of the armor is 25 mm, the angle of inclination is 255 to the vertical. To install the cannon, a rectangular niche was made in the front wall of the turret, which was covered with an armor shield attached to the cannon mantlet.
• The crew of the light T-60 included a commander and a driver.

Photo T 60 Soviet light tank of the Red Army

Light tank T 60 photo , the body was made of rolled armor using electric welding. The front sheets were given a rational angle of inclination. The thickness of the homogeneous armor was 15-20 mm, while the combat weight of the first series of vehicles was 5.8 tons. Since October 1941, the armor protection was strengthened to 25-35 mm, and its combat weight increased to 6.48 tons.
It used the GAZ-11 engine model 202. The main engine start was carried out by the crank. It was allowed to use an electric starter either in combat or if the engine was well warmed up. For this purpose, a pre-heater was used, working with a gasoline blowtorch. It must be emphasized that the heater was used for the first time on a domestic tank. Subsequently, all light tanks and self-propelled guns designed by N.A. Astrov were supplied with such heaters.

Photo T 60, on the right - a version of the tank with enhanced armor protection

The main clutch and 4-speed gearbox were of a new design - GAZ-51 type. The transmission included: a driveshaft, a bevel main gear, two onboard multi-disc clutches with band brakes and two single-row final drives. The chassis is T-40 type. Cast rubber-coated road wheels with spokes were partially used.

The crew of the T-40 tank, note the version with a machine gun (DShK), today there is not a single copy left in museums or private collections

Unlike the T-40, the driver's seat was equipped with an armored cabin with a folding flap in the front plate. For landing of the driver and commander-gunner, there were hatches with armored covers in the roof of the wheelhouse and in the roof of the turret.

T40S land machine gun (with DShK) modification of the light amphibious tank T-40, about 190 units were produced; already in the process of production of the vehicles, the buoyancy of the tank was abandoned

According to N.A. Astrov, " Light tank T 60 photo "should have successfully replaced the T-40. But, since the decree of June 25, 1941 remained in force, N.A. Astrov, together with the senior military representative at the plant V.P. Okunev, decided to contact (a letter with two signatures) directly to The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. Stalin, bypassing departmental and government authorities. In the letter, they outlined all the circumstances justifying the production of the T-50 at plant No. 37. The letter was delivered to the Kremlin reception and was immediately handed over to Stalin.

A column of Soviet light tanks T-60 with landing troops fords a river photo winter 1941

Having learned about this, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and at the same time People's Commissar of Medium Engineering V.A. Malyshev (who was in charge of the entire tank industry) arrived at plant No. 37 the very next day (Nikolai Alexandrovich personally told the author of these lines about this). After reviewing the prototype T-60, Malyshev came to the conclusion that Astrov’s position on this issue was completely justified. At the same time, he warned: “Just look, either your chest is covered in crosses, or your head is in the bushes.” And in the government decree of August 16, 1941 on the military-economic plan for the fourth quarter and on increasing the production of tanks, instead of the T-50, a new brand appeared - "T-60". The second copy of the resolution bore N.A.’s visa. Astrov.

Photo of a T-60 light tank with troops on board, a sapper with a VIM-210 mine detector neutralized German T Mi 35 anti-tank mines with a T Mi Z 35 fuse

The production of 10 thousand T-60 tanks was planned to be carried out in Moscow (plant No. 37), in Kharkov (KhTZ) and in Gorky (GAZ). However, the evacuation that began forced us to reconsider this plan. Moscow plant No. 37 in the summer and autumn of 1941 was sole supplier front light tanks T-40, and then T-30. There, in the pilot workshop, an installation batch of T-60 was produced. But there was no time to master serial production in Moscow. There was a need to create and develop new production capacities in the eastern regions of the country.
The Gorky Automobile Plant was the most ready to begin serial production as soon as possible, so an order was issued to send one of the new cars manufactured to GAZ as a reference model. Since in the conditions of mass evacuation it was almost impossible to order a railway platform, Astrov decided himself, sitting behind the levers, together with a driver from an experimental workshop, to drive the tank from Moscow to Gorky under his own power, without an escort vehicle, without issuing passes and without security, one by one changing with the driver. Less than 24 hours later they stood at the gates of the car plant. There was not a single breakdown along the way. Travel time was approximately 14-16 hours.

A German soldier inspects an abandoned Soviet T-60 light tank and unloads ammunition; a cannon ammunition box is visible on the turret

In October 1941, it was decided to evacuate plant No. 37 to Sverdlovsk. There, by merging several industries (KIM, Podolsk named after Ordzhonikidze, etc.), a new enterprise was formed - plant No. 37 in the Urals, where N.A. was appointed chief designer. Astrov. On the eve of departure to Sverdlovsk N.A. Astrov unexpectedly received an order from GAZ Director N.K. Loskutov to return to the Gorky plant, where in November 1941 he was appointed deputy chief designer of the plant A.A. Lipgart on tank production. Where he soon began to create light T-70, which later became the best light tank of World War II.

The T-60 light tank tows a 45-mm cannon; in the first months of the war, during a period of shortage of tank forces, the sixties were often used for the unusual function of infantry support

Plant No. 37 in the Urals, producing more than one thousand light tanks T 60 photo , stopped their production in July 1942. In connection with the German summer offensive and the approach of the front to Stalingrad, STZ (Stalingrad Tractor Plant) dropped out of the number of T-34 suppliers to the front. To compensate for the reduction in output, the Uralmash plant in Sverdlovsk was focused on the production of medium tanks. To manufacture components and assemblies for the T-34 and supply them to Uralmash, it was decided to use plant No. 37, stopping the construction of the T-60 there, abolishing the plant number and returning it to its previous name. Thus, Metalist, together with the plant named after. Voevodin (also located in Sverdlovsk) was reassigned to Uralmash as branches.

photo T-60, meeting of the Red Army with residents of an occupied village, Stalingrad Front

Production of T-60 tanks in the period 1941-1942. carried out by the GAZ, No. 37 (Sverdlovsk), No. 264 and No. 38 plants in Kirov, together they produced more than 6,000 units.

It was developed in August 1941 under the leadership of Astrov, the main designer of all light tanks of that time.

History of the T-60

In May 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 was given the task of establishing serial production of the T-50. Unfortunately, the plant had modest production capabilities and could not cope with the production of such a complex tank as the T-50. Then the plant workers decided to create a new light tank using the chassis and engine-transmission unit of the T-40 tank.

Permission to produce such a tank was received. It is worth saying that the release permit applied to the T-60 (030) tank, which was externally identical to the T-40 and bore the unofficial name T-30. The T-60 is the second prototype in which the DShK machine gun was replaced by the ShVAK rapid-fire cannon.

The first production T-60 was produced at Moscow plant No. 37 on September 15, 1941. Due to the evacuation of the plant, tank production there was stopped on October 26, and the tank began to be produced at other factories. When the more advanced T-70 appeared in 1942, production of the T-60 continued anyway. A total of 5,920 vehicles have been produced since 1941.

TTX T-60

General information

• Combat weight - 5.8 - 6.4 tons;
• Crew – 2 people;
• Number of issued - 5920 pieces.

Dimensions

• Case length – 4100 mm;
• Case width – 2392 mm;
• Height – 1750 mm;
• Ground clearance – 300 mm.

Booking

• Armor type - homogeneous rolled high hardness;
• Hull forehead (top) - 15/70° and 35/16° mm/deg;
• Body forehead (middle) - 35/−28° mm/deg;
• Body forehead (bottom) - 30/−76° mm/deg;
• Hull side - 15/0° mm/deg;
• Hull stern (top) - 10/76° mm/deg;
• Hull rear (bottom) - 25/−14° mm/deg;
• Bottom – 10 mm;
• Housing roof – 13 mm;
• Gun mantlet – 20 mm;
• Tower side – 25-35/25° mm/deg;
• Tower roof – 10 mm.

Armament

• The caliber and brand of the gun is 20 mm TNSh;
• Barrel length - 82.4 calibers;
• Gun ammunition - 750;
• HV angles: -7…+25°;
• GN angles - 360°;
• Sight - TMFP-1, mechanical;
• Machine gun - 7.62 mm DT.

Mobility

• Engine type - GAZ-202 petrol with liquid cooling;
• Engine power – 70 hp;
• Highway speed – 42 km/h;
• Speed ​​over rough terrain – 20-25 km/h;
• Cruising range on the highway – 410-450 km;
• Specific power - 10.7-12.0 hp;
• Suspension type: individual torsion bar;
• Specific ground pressure - 0.53-0.63 kg/cm²;
• Climbability - 34°;
• The wall to be overcome is 0.6 m;
• The ditch to be overcome is 1.7 m;
• Fordability - 0.9 m.

Modifications of T-60

Officially, the T-60 had no modifications, but there were three variants of this vehicle, which differed in performance characteristics due to the varying weight of the tank:

• Early T-60 with 25 mm rolled cemented frontal armor, with a sloth not identical to the road wheels;
• The main production T-60 with 35 mm rolled homogeneous frontal armor of high hardness, road wheels and sloth are unified;
• Shielded T-60 weighing up to 6.5 tons.

Experienced tanks

• T-60-1 - a tank with a more powerful and heavier ZIS-16 bus engine, reinforced armor and larger dimensions;

• T-60 with a ZIS-19 cannon of 37 mm caliber. It required a heavier turret, as a result of which the tank's power reserve was greatly reduced, and the strong firing of the barrel quickly made the gun useless;
• T-60-2 is a tank with a new turret and a ZIS-19BM cannon of 45 mm caliber. It also had a shorter range, but was overall better than the previous model. Not released due to the appearance of the T-70;
• T-60-3 is a tank with a modified standard turret without a roof and two DShK machine guns. It had poor ergonomics of the combat position and an incorrectly installed anti-aircraft sight, which did not allow the tank to be used to combat enemy air.

Many other vehicles were also created on the basis of the T-60, the most interesting of which was the A-40, an air tank. The A-40 is a T-60 tank mounted on a special towed glider to include the tank in an airborne assault force. There was even a prototype A-40, which showed that the designers did not take into account many factors, which is why the project was closed and the “winged tanks” were never produced.

Application

For the first time, the T-60 was used en masse in the Battle of Moscow - it was in almost all tank battalions and tank brigades. In the spring of 1942, T-60s arrived on the Leningrad Front, and they were delivered to the besieged city on coal barges, which was a very good camouflage - German troops did not hunt for the familiar fuel. The movement of the tanks was never discovered by German troops.

T-60s also fought on the southern front, mainly in 1942 in the Crimea, and took part in the defense of Stalingrad and the Kharkov operation.

The number of T-60s was significantly reduced by November 1942, as it was very easy prey for tanks and was considered a suicide tank. Tankers did not like these tanks at all, calling them BM-2 - a mass grave for two. But enemy soldiers called the T-60 “indestructible locusts.”

The last major operation in which the T-60 took part was the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in 1944.

Memory of a tank

Today we know of at least six surviving T-60s:

• Pre-production T-60 at the Armored Museum in Kubinka;
• An unrestored T-60 at the Tank Museum in Parole, Finland;
• T-60 restored to running condition in the Vadim Zadorozhny Museum of Technology. It was found destroyed near St. Petersburg, the site of the last mass use of the T-60;
• T-60 in the form of a monument in the Rostov region, in the village of Glubokiy;
• T-60 on the move at the “Military Glory of the Urals” museum near Yekaterinburg. Every year he takes part in the parade in honor of Victory Day;
• T-60 in the Battle of Stalingrad museum complex, raised in 2011 from the bottom of a dry river and restored at a special machine building plant.