home Received the first Il-22PP “Porubshchik” electronic warfare aircraft, created by Experimental machine-building plant them. Myasishchev on the basis of the Il-18 aircraft, the United Aircraft Corporation reported. The newest complex
capable of selectively suppressing enemy electronics with strong interference, maintaining the combat readiness of domestic military equipment.
On the completion of state tests of a prototype aircraft with a recommendation for its adoption into service with the Russian Aerospace Forces, Director of EMZ named after. Myasishchev reported to the Minister of Defense during the single military acceptance day on October 21, 2016, the report says.
In November 2016, it is planned to transfer two more production aircraft to the customer.
The complex’s equipment allows you to effectively combat modern long-range radar warning aircraft such as the US Air Force AWACS, radio equipment of Patriot air defense systems and jam the control channels of military drones.
The IL-22PP is also capable of conducting electronic reconnaissance and group protection of its aircraft from enemy electronic warfare systems. All the advanced radio-electronic components of the Il-22PP aircraft were developed by enterprises and institutes that are part of the Radioelectronic Technologies concern (), an adviser to the first deputy told Gazeta.Ru general director
KRET Vladimir. “The combat capabilities of the Porubshchik far exceed anything that has been created in this area previously. The IL-22PP has a very good characteristics for reconnaissance, these aircraft can work as part of a group, and the equipment on board is the most modern - digital technology
and phased array antennas.
The Il-20/Il-22 family of military aircraft was created on the basis of the civilian turboprop airliner Il-18 (according to Coot codification - “Coot”), which began to be mass-produced in the USSR back in the late 1950s. The IL-18 interested the military due to its efficiency and ability to stay in the air for a long time.
Several vehicles were created on the Il-20 platform special purpose. In particular, measuring systems for testing rocketry, aircraft electronic intelligence and Il-22 air command posts.
There are several varieties of these machines. One of them - Il-22M11 - latest version Russian air command post. The other is a modification of the Il-20M radio reconnaissance aircraft based on the Monitor and Anagram projects.
“Porubshchik” is the latest modification of this aircraft. This aircraft is equipped with the latest electronic warfare equipment, in particular side-mounted antennas and towed transmitters that extend several hundred meters in flight.
When creating this electronic warfare system, some technical solutions were applied, thanks to which the Porubshchik acquired the ability to act exclusively on signals with a certain frequency, without affecting others.
Previously electronic warfare systems previous models during operation often suppressed signals not only from enemy electronic systems, but also from their own assets.
Before turning on the Porubshchik active jamming system, it scans all available radio signals and finds the frequencies at which enemy transmitters operate, a KRET representative told Gazeta.Ru. At this time, the aircraft itself does not emit anything and the equipment operates exclusively in receive mode. After detecting the enemy's most important communication channel or enemy radar signal, equipment operators jam in the required frequency range.
Several of these aircraft will be able to disrupt or even completely paralyze enemy early warning aircraft, flying command posts, air defense systems, aircraft and drones over a large area.
Development work on the Porubshchik project began under the government contract dated November 8, 2009, the deputy director told Gazeta.Ru.
“The prototype Il-22P (registration number RA-75903) began flight development tests in 2011, state joint tests began in 2014 and were completed last year. The re-equipment of the second (first production) Il-22PP aircraft was carried out by the Myasishchev plant under a 2012 contract (aircraft registration number - RF-90786). The conversion of the third (second production) Il-22PP aircraft was carried out under a contract dated June 11, 2014. All three aircraft were converted from Il-22 air control centers.”
Built in the late 1970s, the vehicle was repaired and modernized before the installation of electronic warfare equipment. The most noticeable difference between the Il-22PP aircraft and the basic modification are several large fairings on the sides, inside of which the antennas are located.
The most modern concepts wars are unthinkable without the use of early warning aircraft and a variety of drones. And Il-22PP aircraft with Porubshchik can become the main threat to a potential enemy, paralyzing its communication channels and detection systems.
Determination of coordinates and movement parameters
Depending on the number of radars, methods of simultaneous direction finding (triangulation method based on data from two or more radars) and sequential direction finding (based on data from one radar) can be used.
The main way to determine the current coordinates and flight parameters of an active jammer is the triangulation method.
Its essence lies in the fact that the jammer’s place (the area of possible location) is determined at the point of intersection of the bisectors of the corners of illuminated sectors on the screens of two or more interacting radars. (Fig. 17.3.)
The OCU, knowing the location of the interacting radar (azimuth, range), receives the azimuth values of the jammer from the radar operator and applies them with a glass graph to the PPI screen relative to the interacting radar. At the same time, the OBU plots the jammer's azimuth lines relative to its radar.
Rice. 17.3. Determining the coordinates of the active jammer
in a triangulation way
Based on the position of the azimuth intersection points on the PPI screen, the jammer’s coordinates (azimuth and range) are determined, and based on the direction and speed of movement of the azimuth intersection points, the jammer’s movement parameters (course and speed) are determined. (Fig. 17.4).
Rice. 17.4. Determining the director's movement parameters
active interference in a triangulation way
The accuracy of determining the coordinates and movement parameters of the jammer depends on the determination method.
The triangulation method is characterized by the following:
At the jamming start range of 200 ÷ 250 km from the radar, the root mean square errors in determining the location of the director are 6 ÷ 9 km;
At a distance of 100 ÷ 120 km errors are reduced to 2 ÷ 2.5 km;
At a distance of 200 ÷ 250 km, the errors in determining the course and speed are so large that it is impractical to use such parameters to solve the guidance problem. Errors in determining the course reach 30°, and in speed - 300 km/h.
When the range decreases to 100 km, the errors in determining the course and speeds are 5° and 100 km/h, respectively. This ensures the solution of the guidance problem with sufficient accuracy.
If there is one radar The coordinates and flight parameters of the jammer can be determined by sequential direction finding.
The essence of the method is that based on the expected speed of the jammer, a line of scale-time segments is constructed ∆S=Vс×∆t, consisting of two segments, and threefold direction finding of the jammer is performed over time ∆t.
The azimuth lines of the jammer are marked on the PPI Az1, Az2, Az3 . The ruler is applied to the PPI in such a way that the ends of the segments ∆S coincided with the azimuth lines.
Rice. 17.5. Determining the movement parameters of the active director
interference using a ruler of scale-time intervals
The location of the jammer (azimuth, range) is determined by the position of the end of the second segment and the line of the third azimuth, and by the direction of the segment ∆S – jammer course (Fig. 17.5.).
The jammer's flight altitude is determined by the altimeter screen.
To do this you need:
By slowly rotating the PRV antenna, determine the average azimuth of the interference sector from the maximum interference signal;
Using the triangulation method, determine the azimuth and range of the director;
Rotate the altimeter antenna to the director's azimuth;
Draw a line in the middle of the illuminated sector;
Using the corresponding range, find the point of intersection of the specified line with the interference sector line;
Determine the height of the jammer.
I decided to repeat it myself. 934 were not available, so I installed 911 instead. The thing worked out quite well - in a building in the center of the city (i.e., not far from the TV and Radio tower) on 2 floors, FM radio is almost not received (very strong interference - you can’t make out anything) .
TVs on all channels - image 0, sound 0. When receiving on an external antenna (on the roof of the building - up to the jammer of the 2nd floor) on the UHF, sound breaks through on some channels, the image can be said 0. I am very pleasantly surprised by the work of this jammer.
The effect of tetra is much less!
Use case:
T1 BFR91A
T2 2T610A without radiator
T3 KT913B on the radiator
Coil data:
L1 2W 0.4 D4
L2, L5 14W0.3 on a circle 10x6x4.5 M1500nn
L3 5W0.4 D4
L4 2W 1.0 D8
L6 3W 0.4 D4
L7 0.5W 0.7 D4
L8 27W 0.3 D5 (11mm)
L9 4W 0.4 STEP0.5 D4
L10 1W 1.0 D5
L11 17W 0.3 D5 (6mm)
C7,C8 “CD” 2kB 0.022mf or any that can withstand the power.
It is better not to install ordinary ceramics.
The board is 1.5mm 2-way reverse side connected to ground near C5.
R6 100 Ohm
Rx *18 Ohm*switch between L8 and +power
Attention
! MINIMUM safe Rx values are indicated; it is better not to reduce them.
I burned out my only KT913 when I tried to raise the collector current to 0.9A (close to the maximum -1A according to the reference book!)
Test results:
Supply voltage U=14.4V
I=0.7A:
RF voltage (Urf) at 50 Ohm load = 12V.
When the antenna is DISCONNECTED (the output is loaded with 50 Ohms, powered through a high-pass filter) within a radius of 5-7 m, the FM radio hisses throughout the entire range, a TV with a room antenna directed in the opposite direction barely catches 3 UHF channels, the LPD radio station opens the noise suppressor. When connecting a piece of 1m wire within a radius of 15-25m (I didn’t check further), the FM radio and MF are completely jammed, 2 UHF channels (the most durable) are received on an external antenna 1 floor above with strong interference.
Other transistors
KT920V Rx 11Ohm I=0.9A Urf=14.5V
Radio Killer! FM jams throughout the house, same with CF. However, many UHF channels are received fairly well by an external antenna. The main power is somewhere up to 200-300 MHz
2T911A Rx 18 Ohm I=0.4A Urf=8.5V
Most likely, you need to calculate the matching circuits specifically for it, or you just got a defective copy, or I burned it like a KT913 because I initially set the collector current to about 0.4A, but this later turned out to be its limit!
The parameters are suitable, but have not been tested due to the lack of transistors:
KT919, KT925, KT962, KT916, etc. If you have them, try them! And don't forget to share the result.
conclusions:
The well-known scheme on 4 KT939 is resting because This design is cheaper, the power is higher, the possibility of matching with an antenna gives incomparably greater efficiency.
This material was taken from the site http://www.vrtp.ru/
Tu-16SPS. Active radio jamming stations SPS-1 and SPS-2, which were installed on the Tu-16 in the 1950s, were intended for group protection of attack vehicles flying in formation from radars developed in the forties, and had relatively low characteristics - insufficient power radiation, large dimensions and weight. To use them, another crew member was required - a special equipment operator, who had to first detect a working radar, determine its frequency, and then adjust the jammer to it. To do this, even with good preparation, the operator needed approximately 3 minutes. During this time, especially when flying at low altitudes, the aircraft managed to overshoot the zone from which the power of the onboard equipment made it possible to suppress this radar. In addition, SPS-1 and SPS-2 did not provide effective suppression of multi-channel and tunable stations.
However, plant No. 1 in 1955-57. produced 42 Tu-16s equipped with SPS-1, and 102 with SPS-2, of which four were refueled in flight. Like the Tu-16R, a sealed, removable special operator’s cabin was installed in the rear of the cargo compartment of these vehicles. Bomb weapons could be suspended in the front part of the cargo compartment. Two antennas of the SPS-2 station, covered with drop-shaped fairings, were located in the lower part of the fuselage in front of and behind the cargo compartment. The SPS-1 whip antennas could be placed in two places: on top of the fuselage (behind the navigator-operator's blister) or on the bottom of the fuselage (in front of the cargo compartment). These variants of the Tu-16 were designated Tu-16SPS, sometimes they were called Tu-16P. Initially, the Tu-16SPS were not equipped with ASO-16 reflector reset machines, and the absence of their outlet necks on the bomb bay doors was external hallmark from subsequent Tu-16E. But later machine guns began to be installed on this type of aircraft, and the external difference disappeared. In the 1960s Almost all Tu-16SPS in service were equipped with the Buket active jamming system.
Tu-16P. In the second half of the 1950s. in the USSR, the “Bouquet” system was developed, which, unlike SPS-1 and SPS-2, could work in automatic mode and interfere with several radars simultaneously, including multi-channel and tunable ones. The Buket system included active jamming stations SPS-22, SPS-33, SPS-44 and SPS-55, each of which covered a certain frequency range. For the Tu-16, special modifications of stations were prepared taking into account the conditions of their operation on the aircraft - SPS-22N, SPS-ZZN, SPS-44N and SPS-55N (the index “N” meant that the station was intended for the product “N”). Aircraft equipped with the "Bouquet" system were designated Tu-16P or product "NP" (sometimes - Tu-16P "Bouquet" or Tu-16 "Bouquet"). They were intended to counter ground-based radars long-range detection and guidance, as well as SAM target designation radar. From an altitude of 10,000-11,000 m, one jammer could cover a group of several aircraft flying in formation in a conventional circle with a diameter of 3,000-5,000 m in a hemispherical zone with a diameter at the base of 600-700 km.
For its time, “Bouquets” were the most powerful jamming stations in the world, and the methods of protecting radars that existed at that time did not save them from jamming. At the same time, the “Bouquets” were heavy and had significant energy intensity. A cargo compartment was used to accommodate them, while the bomber armament and doors were completely dismantled. Instead, a platform was installed with “Bouquet” blocks, which were vertically standing cylindrical containers with a pressurization system. There were also four additional converters of the PO-6000 type and one of the PT-6000 type, which fed the “Bouquet” alternating current. Arrangement equipment could be installed in the rear part of the cargo compartment passive interference ASO-2B. At the bottom of the platform, along the axis of the aircraft, there was a long box-shaped fairing (3/4 of the length of the cargo compartment) of the station antennas, which became a characteristic external feature of the Tu~16P. At the edges of the platform on both sides there were openings for the air conditioning system of the Bouquet blocks, covered by fairings. The automation of the station made it possible to do without an additional crew member - the navigator-operator controlled it from his workplace.
Since 1962, the Buket system has been equipped with: 34 aircraft with the SPS-22N station, 9 with the SPS-ZZN station, 28 with the SPS-44N station and 20 with the SPS-55N station. With the transition to low-altitude flights, some Tu-16Ps were re-equipped with the SPS-77 station, optimized for operation in such conditions. Not only the Tu-16SPS was modified, but also the Tu-16 “Yelka” (see below), as well as some other modifications of the aircraft.
The experience of using the Tu-16P has shown that with a dense arrangement of attack vehicles flying in formation, the use of the “Bouquet” system is fraught with the suppression of not only the enemy’s radar, but also its own on-board radars. Therefore, “Bouquet” had to be revised and supplemented in 1972 special equipment, capable of emitting a powerful signal with a narrow beam pattern, 10 Tu-16P aircraft (with SPS-22N and SPS-44N stations) were equipped with Ficus equipment. Its five directional antennas with a rotation system were installed under the fuselage between frames No. 34 and No. 45 under a large radio-transparent fairing. Tests of the improved jamming system were carried out on Tu-16P No. 1882409 and No. 1883117.
Jammer Tu-16SPS
The Tu-16E jammer is known in NATO under the designation Badger-H
Tu-16A, used for testing the REP "Siren" station
It was planned to install the experimental “Silikat” equipment on one of the serial Kuibyshev aircraft (No. 1882106), the set of units of which was completely ready in March 1956. Somewhat later, instead of “Silikat”, they installed on this aircraft new system setting up active radio interference "Lantern", however, these options are mass production were not launched. In the second half of the 60s. serial Tu-16P No. 5202907 was equipped with the SPS-100 “Rezeda-AK” station. The Argon sight and rear cannon mount were removed from the aircraft, and a tail compartment with station equipment was installed instead. The SPS-100 kit also included the SPO-3 “Sirena-3” radiation warning station. In this form, the jammer successfully passed tests, and the SPS-100 system was adopted for the Tu-16. However, combat Tu-16Ps were not equipped with them; starting in 1969, some other modifications of the Tu-16 received them. Several Tu-16Ps were equipped with the SPS-120 “Cactus” station, the units of which were also placed in the cargo compartment on the platform.
During 1970-80 The equipment of the Tu-16P was constantly modernized. In particular, individual and group protection stations of the SPS-151, SPS-152 or SPS-153 type from the Lilac kit were installed. The Siren station blocks were located in technical compartment fuselage and in the tail fairing container installed instead of the rear gun mount of the DK-7. The system's transmitting antennas were located on both sides of the fuselage in the area of the engine air intakes, and the receiving antennas were located in the area of the first fuselage frame.
Tu-16P with RPZ-59. On July 21, 1959, Council of Ministers Resolution No. 832-372 was issued, which provided for the creation of a new passive anti-radar system personal protection Tu* 16. Based on this document, on the basis of the serial K-5 (K-51) air-to-air missile, OKB-134 developed prototypes of the RPZ-59 “Avtostrada-1” anti-radar missile. After the launch of this missile from the Tu-16, packs of dipole reflectors were thrown out of its rear compartment, forming a cloud of passive interference in front of the aircraft. Six missiles could be suspended from the DPU-RPZ holders in the cargo compartment of the Tu-16, launched either singly or in series at certain intervals. State tests of the system were carried out on the modified Tu-16P No. 8204130 until the beginning of 1964 and showed that in this form it was unacceptable: the flight of the missiles was unstable and dangerous for the carrier aircraft, there were cases of spontaneous derailment of missiles, etc. Taking into account the experience gained, in 1964 the creation of a new anti-radar system "Pylon" began, including the Tu-16P carrier aircraft with the Buket station and 12 RPZ-59 missiles placed on underwing pylons (six under each plane). Since 1972, a small number of Tu-16Ps have been equipped with such a system.
Tu-16 "Yelka" and Tu-16E. In parallel with the creation of the Tu-16SPS active jammer, OKB-156 developed a passive jammer, which received the designation Tu-16 “Elka”. Along the entire length of its cargo compartment there were 7 ASO-16 automatic noise release machines. The compartment doors had cutouts (three on the left, four on the right) for the outlet necks of the machines. In the unoccupied volume of the compartment it was possible to hang bomb weapons. In addition, the Tu-16 “Yelka” was equipped with an SPS-4 “Modulation” jamming station, its teardrop-shaped fairing was attached in front of the cargo compartment. When the ASO-16 was removed, the aircraft turned into a full-fledged bomber. In the 60s On vehicles of this modification, in addition to seven ASO-16s, two APP-22 assault rifles began to be installed. In this case, there was no longer any space left to place bombs.
In 1957, Plant No. 1 produced 42 production Tu-16 “Yolka” with an in-flight refueling system, and another 10 vehicles were delivered to the Air Force by Plant No. 64 in the same year. In addition, 19 bombers from Plant No. 22 were converted to this variant (all of them had a refueling system). Thus, in total, the Air Force received 71 jammers of this modification. Subsequently, the Tu-16 Elka aircraft were repeatedly modernized and improved, gradually approaching the characteristics of the Tu-16PT, becoming combined active and passive jammers.
Another version of the passive jammer, designated Tu-16E or product “NOT” (in units this modification was also often called “Yolka”), was close in composition to the jamming equipment of the Tu-16R. Just like on the reconnaissance aircraft, a special operator’s cabin and one of the SPS-1, SPS-2 or SPS-2K “Pion” stations were installed on it in the rear part of the cargo compartment. Two ASO-16 units were also installed there. Bomb racks were retained in the front part of the compartment, but over time, additional ASO-16 took the place of the bombs, and two APP-22 assault rifles were also installed. Since 1957, over three years, plant No. 1 produced 51 Tu-16Es. Another 38 vehicles were produced by Plant No. 22 in 1958, all with an in-flight refueling system. Externally, the Tu-16E differed from the Tu-16 “Yelka” by the cutouts in the cargo compartment doors for the entrance hatch of the operator’s cabin.
A distinctive external feature of the Tu-16 “Yelka” was the outlet necks for dumping dipole reflectors
In the cargo compartments of some Tu-16 "Elka" and Tu-16E stations were installed SPS-61, SPS-62, SPS-63, SPS-64, SPS-65 or SPS-66, which were united under the common name "Azalea". The crew of the aircraft, designated Tu-16E Azalea, did not include a special operator. SPS-6 “Los” stations were also installed on aircraft with SPS-61, SPS-62 and SPS-63, and SPS-5 “Fasol” stations were installed on aircraft with SPS-64, SPS-65 and SPS-66. Bombs or ASO-16 and APP-22 machine guns were hung in the unoccupied part of the cargo compartment. On the Tu-16 "Yolka" the Azalia antenna was located in the front part of the cargo compartment, and on the Tu-16E - in the place of the entrance hatch of the dismantled suspended pressurized cabin. On most Tu-16E Azalia aircraft, a tail fairing was installed instead of the DK-7.
In some Tu-16 "Yelka" and Tu-16E "Azalea" active jamming stations SPS-100A and SPS-100M were also installed, and on some of the vehicles the radiation warning system SPO-15 "Bereza" was installed. At the end of the 1970s. These jammers began to be equipped with SPS-151, SPS-152 or SPS-153 stations from the “Lilac” set. During operation, the machines were constantly improved both in terms of equipment and aircraft systems. Several Tu-16Es were converted into the Tu-16ER variant, on which, instead of the SPS-2 station, SRS-1 electronic reconnaissance stations were installed.
Tu-16E-HR. Another version of the jammer was designated in documents as the Tu-16E, and in everyday life as the Tu-16E-HR (chemical reconnaissance aircraft). This aircraft was intended for photographic, radio engineering, radiation and chemical reconnaissance and in terms of equipment it was very close to the Tu-16RR. The presence of radio countermeasures on board only facilitated the performance of aerial reconnaissance missions. The crew of the Tu-16E-HR consisted of seven people. In the bow of the cargo compartment, two AFA-42/100 aerial cameras were placed on swinging platforms. in the rear part of the compartment there is a suspended pressurized operator's cabin. In the middle part of the cargo compartment it was possible to hang bombs or up to four ASO-16 machine guns. The wing structure was strengthened; two containers were suspended under the wing on pylons for taking air samples. Radio countermeasures, in addition to ASO-16, included SPS-5, SPS-151 stations and two sets of SPS-1. Antennas
SPS-5 were located at the bottom of the fuselage in front of the cargo compartment, SPS-151 - near the engine air intakes, SPS-1
Behind the suspended pressurized cabin below and above the fuselage. Two aircraft produced by plant No. 1 were converted in a similar way. One of them was operated in the 226th OAP REP (separate electronic countermeasures aviation regiment) in Poltava until 1978, then in 1978-80. - in Pryluky, and since 1980
In Spaska-Dalny, where the second car flew away its entire life. In 1979-80 During the repair process, the aircraft were equipped with the Rogovitsa and SPS-152 stations (additional antennas were installed on the canopy of the navigator's cockpit).
The total number of variants of jammers based on the Tu-16 is almost impossible to unambiguously determine. So, for example, the 226th OAP REP included about thirty Tu-16s with jamming equipment, and each of them differed from the others in the composition and type of equipment. With the advent of missiles with thermal homing heads in service with the armies of the potential enemy, parts of the Tu-16, including the Tu-16P, began to install infrared jamming equipment of the ASO-2I-7ER type, the units of which were installed in the chassis fairings and in the tail section fuselage. Other work was also carried out to improve electronic countermeasures systems.
Present reference manual materials on industrial designs of special equipment of domestic and foreign production intended for information protection are presented.
Information about methods of collecting and monitoring information using technical means is provided in an accessible form.
More than 100 schematic diagrams of information and object protection devices are presented, the logic and principles of operation of these devices are described, and recommendations for installation and configuration are given. Methods and means of protecting user information are considered personal computers from unauthorized access. Are given brief descriptions and recommendations for use software products and restricted access systems.
The book is intended for a wide range of readers, trained radio amateurs who want to apply their knowledge in the field of protecting objects and information, and specialists involved in information security issues.
It is of interest for heads of government and other organizations interested in protecting commercial information.
Jammers various types and range are effective devices for protecting conversations from eavesdropping, as well as for jamming radio microphones and making noise on wire lines. On the Russian market, these devices are represented almost exclusively by noise generators in the radio and audio ranges, as well as their combinations.
The catalogs of leading companies do not list jammers in the infrared and microwave ranges. This is also due to the fact that the transmitters and receivers of these ranges have a sharp radiation pattern, and in order to suppress the signal from the transmitters of these ranges, the jammer must accurately guess the location of the receiving device, otherwise the interference will be ineffective. From the above, it is obvious that the more directional antennas radio microphones and their receiving devices, the more difficult it is to interfere with them. In addition, with the same signal level, such radio links have a greater range.
Radio interference signals are usually divided into barrage and targeting signals. Barrier interference is placed over the entire frequency range in which the radio transmitter is supposed to operate, and targeted interference is placed exactly at the frequency of this radio transmitting device.
The spectrum of the barrage signal is, as a rule, noise or pseudonoise in nature. These can be generators based on a gas-discharge noise tube, on a noise diode, on a thermal noise source, etc. Lately Pulse signals of a pseudo-random nature are increasingly being used.
Many experts are skeptical about the possibility of effectively setting up barrage against commercial intelligence transmitters. This is primarily due to the fact that it is necessary to interfere over a very large frequency range, from approximately 20 MHz to 1 GHz, and this means that the jammer must have an unacceptably high power for indoor environments. Nevertheless, such devices are present in the catalogs of leading companies. For example, the domestic portable radio noise generator G-1, which covers the band from 50 to 450 MHz and has a power of 1.5 W from batteries and 3 W from the mains. Such a generator can operate from internal batteries for one hour.
Devices that create targeted interference seem to be more effective. The diagram of such a jammer is shown in Fig. 5.13.
Rice. 5.13 Structural scheme jammer
The jammer operates in automatic mode. The scanner receiver scans the entire radio range, the frequency meter measures the frequencies of detected radio transmitters, the microprocessor analyzes the incoming data, comparing them with those recorded in the memory, and when signals not stored in the memory appear, it commands the radio transmitter to set up targeted interference. The appearance of such a software and hardware complex is shown in Fig. 5.14.
Rice. 5.14. Hardware and software complex for setting up targeted interference
Naturally, the disadvantage of such a device is its much higher cost.
There are noise generators designed to protect against information leakage through the channels of unwanted electromagnetic radiation from electronic computer equipment. Since the spectrum of spurious emissions is mostly known in advance, it is not difficult to calculate the spectrum of the jammer.
One example of such a device is the domestic stationary noise generator "Gnome-3".
Output signal level at the generator output connectors in the frequency ranges:
from 10 kHz to 150 kHz……………….not less than 70 dB;
from 150 kHz to 30 kHz………………at least 70 dB;
from 30 MHz to 400 kHz………………not less than 75 dB;
from 400 MHz to 1 GHz………………..not less than 45 dB.
The most widespread are jammers in the acoustic range. These relatively simple and inexpensive devices create spatial noise in the main spectrum of sound frequencies, which provides masking of the conversation and reduces the effectiveness of eavesdropping devices. The most effective are devices whose vibrators are installed around the perimeter of the entire room, including on the floor, ceiling, walls, ventilation holes etc. For example, we will describe several such devices.
Acoustic noise generator ANG-2000
ANG-2000 suppresses such eavesdropping devices as:
Wired wall-mounted microphones:
Contact (stethoscopes);
Directional microphones;
Radio transmitters;
Laser eavesdropping devices through window glass.
This is achieved by a specially designed device that generates noise and protects speech from being heard. The ANG-2000 is a device that complements other special protection equipment, and can also be used independently to provide all-round protection of premises from eavesdropping.
The ANG-2000 generator kit includes a variety of acoustic transducers (adapters) for double walls, ceilings, windows, plumbing, ventilation ducts, etc.
Frequency range………broadband noise 250 Hz - 5 kHz
Output voltage….from 0 to 14 V
Weight………………………1.4 kg
Dimensions………………..43x152x254 mm
Power…………………from the network
Converter:
Dimensions…………101x38 mm
Weight……………….0.906 kg
Stationary acoustic noise generator AD-24
Appearance a stationary acoustic noise generator placed in a suitcase is shown in Fig. 5.15.
Rice. 5.15. Acoustic noise generator AD-24
This device is professional system noise reduction for large rooms. Vibrators installed on the floor, ceiling, and walls are connected to the generator. The number of vibrators depends on the size of the room. Mains powered.
White noise generator G-002 (Russia)
Emits so-called "white noise" in the main spectrum of sound frequencies. G-002 is effective, first of all, due to its direct impact on the input low-frequency paths of listening devices. Compact body, aesthetic appearance, power supply from both a 220 V network and a built-in battery, along with ease of use, make the G-002 useful not only for professionals, but also for a wide range of people not associated with this kind of equipment. The price of such a device is about $110.
Desktop audio noise generator AD-23 (USA)
The appearance of the device is shown in Fig. 5.16
Rice. 5.16. Desktop audio noise generator AD-23
The AD-23 is a cost-effective audio jammer for use in the office, home or meeting. The noise speaker and the electronic unit are made in one housing. The noise area reaches 25 m2. The interference frequency range is from 20 Hz to 20 kHz. Speaker output power is up to 4 W. Power supply - from the network or built-in batteries. Battery life is 3 hours. Dimensions: 220x160x100 mm. Weight 560 g.
Audio noise generator AD-22 (USA)
The appearance of the device is shown in Fig. 5.17
Rice. 5.17. Audio noise generator AD-22(USA)
The device is a pocket-sized noise generator for protection against eavesdropping and produces a noise-interference signal with varying amplitude and frequency. The interference level is adjustable.
Noise area - up to 16 m2. Battery powered. Dimensions 120x78x55 mm, weight 560 g.
Combined jammers occupy a special place. For example, the domestic generator Gnome-4 is designed to noise the radio air, the power grid and suppress telephone bookmarks.
Radio noise frequency range…from 1 to 1800 MHz,
Power……………………………5 W.
Frequency range for the power grid…….from 3 to 1000 MHz.
Power……………………………4 W.
For telephone lines The operating principle is based on blurring the spectrum of telephone bookmarks. The price of such a device is about $1300.
The combined domestic GBRSh jammer is built into a single-cassette radio and has noise modes in the acoustic and radio ranges. The acoustic noise mode is similar to the mode of the G-002 device. Radio interference occurs in the range from 50 to 900 MHz. Power 3–4 W.
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