Main directions mobilization training and mobilization concern:
Economics;
Authorities;
Armed Forces, other troops, military formations, special forces.
Periods of operation of the system of mobilization measures:
In peacetime - mobilization preparation.
During the transition from peacetime to wartime - mobilization.
In wartime - fulfillment of plans for the accounting year.
During the transition from wartime to peacetime - demobilization.
Mobilization preparation- this is a set of measures carried out in peacetime to prepare the economy in advance Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy municipalities, organ training state power, organs local government and organizations, training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and created in accordance with Federal law“On the defense” of special formations to ensure the protection of the state from armed attack and meet the needs of the state and the needs of the population in wartime.
Mobilization- this is a set of measures to transfer the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, the transfer of state authorities, local governments and organizations to work in wartime conditions, the transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special formations on the organization and composition of wartime.
Mobilization in the Russian Federation may be general or partial. General mobilization covers the entire economy and is carried out throughout the country. With partial mobilization, part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is mobilized in a specific theater (theatres) of military operations, in the regions of the country.
Depending on the situation, mobilization may be open And hidden. Open mobilization is carried out, as a rule, in the event of a sudden outbreak of war by the aggressor or a direct threat of his attack. Covert mobilization is carried out under the guise of ordinary activities of operational and mobilization training of troops (forces) without disclosing the actual purpose of the activities.
Mobilization of observation points;
Allocation of surgical beds in medical institutions;
Deployment of additional beds in medical institutions;
Creation of a mobile reserve of medical and sanitary equipment;
Preparation of donor blood and its components;
Creation of mobilization capacities for the production of bacterial and immunobiological preparations;
Training of medical personnel for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, specialization and improvement of doctors;
The constantly changing and increasingly dangerous political atmosphere of Europe in the 1930s, as well as the constant emergence of new technologies, inevitably influenced Soviet strategic concepts, every time doing existing system concentration of forces that does not meet potential future threats. Svechin's postulate that Soviet Union"permanent mobilization" should be achieved by creating such national economy, which would maximally support the military economy based on the unity of the front and the “state rear”, was not realized. And no Soviet mobilization plan could cope, change or overcome this bare reality.
Territorial cadre troops, which meant training local reservists to supplement the peacetime cadre army, served the Soviets well in the 1920s. After 1935, however, it became apparent that the growing threat required a wartime army that was larger and more technically competent than the territorial system could provide. The peacetime army simply could not be enlarged enough to meet the demands of a future war:
“It is important to note that by the mid-1930s, the mixed territorial-personnel system of recruiting and organizing the armed forces had already exhausted itself and became a brake on their combat growth. There was a real need to move to a common personnel principle of formation. One of the main reasons was that that the temporary personnel of territorial units and formations were no longer able to master the new complex technology and learn to apply it in constantly changing conditions... The transition, for the most part, to a personnel system was dictated by the growing requirements for increased combat and mobilization readiness, as the danger of war with Nazi Germany was growing."
This transition began in 1937, it was supposed to be completed by January 1939, although the transformation of some connections was delayed until the last months of that year. Officially, during the period from January 1, 1937 to January 1, 1939, the total number of Soviet rifle divisions increased from 97 to 98, while the number of personnel divisions increased from 49 to 84, and 35 territorial divisions disappeared from the structure of the armed forces of the Red Army. * In addition, during 1938, the People's Commissariat of Defense also abolished several republican formations and military schools. To provide new divisions with reserve personnel and in preparation for future general mobilization, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued on September 1, 1939 new law on universal conscription. This law increased the period military service for privates and senior sergeants up to three years and provided for more thorough military training.
At the same time, the NPO carried out a reform of the military district system to improve its effectiveness in training personnel, increasing the number of districts to 1 b. New system recruitment of troops and reorganized administrative structure made it possible to expand the Red Army when it was "slipping towards war" between 1939 and June 1941. The total strength of the Red Army increased from 1.5 million people on June 1, 1938 to just over 5 million people in June 1941. The structure of the Red Army's armed forces increased from 27 to 62 rifle corps and from 106 mixed cadre and regular rifle divisions to 196 regular rifle divisions. In addition, the Soviets created 31 motorized (motorized rifle) divisions and 61 tank divisions, 16 airborne brigades, and over 100 new fortified areas (see Table 4.2).
By June 1941, the regular strength of wartime rifle divisions was set at 14,483 people, and peacetime divisions were supposed to be kept at several levels staffing level. At the beginning of 1939, the most numerous divisions (first line), deployed in the border military districts, numbered 6959 fighters, and those located in the interior of the country (second line divisions) on paper had a strength of 5220 fighters. Third-line reserve divisions, which had a small number of personnel in peacetime, were to be formed during mobilization and in wartime from existing divisions. After 1939, the NKO increased the peacetime strength of these divisions, and by June 1941, most divisions in the border military districts had between 60 and 85 percent of their new strength (8,500 to 12,000 fighters*). However, divisions in the internal regions of the country remained closer in number to the requirements of 1939.
The deteriorating political situation in Europe and subsequent crises, which led to a massive increase in the number of active armed forces and projected wartime mobilization, placed the Soviet mobilization system under enormous strain. The ceaseless revision of military and strategic deployment plans sharply and frequently raised the projected wartime strength of the Soviet armed forces whenever crisis or military experience highlighted the weaknesses and inadequacies of current mobilization systems.
It is understandable that these factors forced the General Staff to constantly revise mobilization instructions and plans - which, it hoped, would meet the requirements of the new strategic deployment plans. These new guidelines, modeled after those in force in the 1930s, sought to improve the mobilization system. The mobilization instructions of 1940, in contrast to the instructions of 1930, began with a striking warning: “War against the USSR, which is surrounded by capitalism, can begin suddenly. Modern wars are not declared. They are simply started”? This 1940 exhortation and its 1941 equivalent smack of an increased sense of urgency and preoccupation with the particulars of mobilization.
Within the parameters set out by this manual, the Main Military Council of the Red Army issued an order on August 16, 1940 to prepare a new Mobilization Plan of 1941 (MP-41). A new team of planners at the General Staff, led by Vasilevsky, presented this plan, and the NKO approved it in February 1941. However, like the strategic deployment plans, he soon again demanded changes. As a result, the General Staff decided to revise the plan in March 1941 and ordered the military districts to submit new plans so that the new MP-41 could be ready by May 1. According to one analysis, “this period was clearly insufficient, and as a result, military districts and troops were unable to carefully develop the entire set of measures consistent with the new mobilization deployment scheme. Therefore, many [strategic] directions extended the development of the mobilization plan until June 20, 1940.”
The Central Committee of the Communist Party also contributed to recommendations to military districts. In order to accompany the General Staff’s instructions to the districts, he called: “All of our people are required to maintain a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack.”
The mobilization of the armed forces was the most important element mobilization plan. According to MP-41, it represented “a planned and coordinated transition of each individual military unit, headquarters, directorate, organization and the entire Red Army as a whole from a regular peacetime organization to a regular wartime organization within the time limits prescribed by the mobilization deployment plan.” Plans for the deployment of troops from border military districts assumed various states of readiness, including peacetime units staffed to wartime levels, auxiliary units staffed by career military personnel allocated from peacetime units, auxiliary units deprived of career military personnel in peacetime, as well as units , which were maintained in peacetime states. Mobilization was to be announced by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and recruitment for mobilization and subsequent conscription was to occur on the basis of decrees of the Council of People's Commissars and related orders of NGOs. This process covered all units of the military districts included in the district mobilization plan according to a strict schedule.
By June 1941 new plan was not yet completed and “was not well thought out.” In addition, plans for military districts were only partial and did not include all military formations. The mobilization plan did not contain a mechanism for simultaneously bringing all troops to a state of full combat readiness. All troops in a theater of operations could either be brought to a state of full combat readiness or left in a lower state of "constant readiness." The timing of mobilization also varied depending on the importance and location of the troops. The formations of the first echelon of the covering armies were supposed to be mobilized in 2-3 days, and the remaining formations, units of the rear services and other organizations were supposed to be mobilized in 4-7 days. Full mobilization and deployment of armed forces in the theater of operations should have required 15-30 days from the start of mobilization. All this was consistent with the General Staff's assumptions regarding how the war would begin.
According to MP-41, mobilization could be either covert or open. The first involved the use of large-scale maneuvers to cover the mobilization and was applied primarily to partial mobilization. During covert mobilization, it was supposed to use the so-called mobilization telegram scheme to bring units into a state of combat readiness. Encrypted telegrams were sent to unit commanders who had special sealed packages marked “top secret” and “open only upon receipt of a telegram about mobilization.” According to the regulations, these packages were kept in the safes of the unit chiefs of staff.
The alert notification of open mobilization was to go through normal communication channels and did not require disclosure of the reasons for the mobilization. This mobilization was called "large training gatherings" (or BUS) and was of two types, designated by the letters "A" or "B". During the mobilization of letter "A", units and formations were brought to full strength. Military districts, which had centralized methods for issuing exemptions from mobilization and which were supposed to conduct BUS, provided units and formations with command personnel, soldiers, transport and horses. During the mobilization of letter "B", the troops were to be brought up to normal strength using mobilization resources received from the surrounding territory of the military district, and material support was based on peacetime standards through regular supplies and reserve warehouses.
Despite the obvious shortcomings of the MP-41 and especially unfavorable conditions mobilization and the short time frame for its implementation, the mechanism of the process made it possible to carry out mobilization already in June 1941. According to the mobilization plan, the number of rifle corps and divisions was to remain unchanged (62 and 198, respectively), the number of fronts and armies increased from 1 and 16 to 8 and 29. Moreover, a major increase in the artillery of the RGK (reserve of the High Command), as well as air regiments and air divisions. For the full scale of the envisaged mobilization for MP-41, see Table 4.3
The full implementation of MP-41 meant the conscription of almost 5 million reservists, including 600,000 officers and 885,000 petty officers and sergeants, as well as the transfer from the national economy of 248,000 cars, 36,000 tractors and 730,000 horses. The total number of mobilized and deployed formations would be equivalent to 344 divisions - 25 divisions more than provided for in the January mobilization plan. Since many of these formations were not at full combat strength, the plan provided for their replacement during the initial stages of hostilities.
Although the mobilization plan allocated 6.5 million conscripts from the Western military districts total number troops to mobilize 7.85 million fighters, by June 22 the number of troops in the western military districts reached only 2,901,000 fighters.
Despite the large-scale organizational expansion required by this plan, the Soviet material base and production capacity were insufficient to support such a large-scale mobilization. At the beginning of 1941, personnel formations and units had 76 percent of their regular artillery, 31 percent heavy, 74 percent medium and 100 percent light tanks, and the Red Army air fleet had very few modern aircraft. There were not enough cars and tractors, and civilian mobilization resources covered 81.5 percent of the required machines and 70 percent of the required tractors*. However, much of this equipment was worn out and, in addition, would have entered the army only some time after the announcement of mobilization. Finally, all this equipment, which was supposed to provide the Red Army with proper mobility, still needed to be transported over considerable distances before it would reach its units. Logistics support was also very weak - according to the General Staff, existing supplies could only be enough for two to three months of wartime operations.
Although on paper the mobilization plan provided the army with the necessary forces and equipment to create the operational strategic groupings required by the military plans, the accompanying logistics plans were woefully inadequate. The Red Army lacked the mobilizable emergency strategic reserves needed to replace initial wartime losses until Soviet industry could produce them in sufficient quantities.
“The significant increase in the needs for weapons and military equipment under the new mobilization plan, especially in tanks, aircraft and anti-aircraft systems, caused, given existing resources, an increase in the shortage of weapons. Therefore, for example, the mechanized corps formed in the Western and Odessa military districts were provided tanks by only 35-40 percent and were equipped mainly with four or five brands of light vehicles. Aviation, air defense and other types of troops were in approximately the same situation."
According to the conclusion of contemporary Soviet critics, during the period of Tymoshenko's reforms and in developing the development of plans for the strategic deployment of troops and mobilization, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff:
"... violated the important requirement of coordinating the deployment of armed forces with the economic potential of the country, especially in the production of means of armed warfare.
It would take about five years to supply the Red Army with the weapons and military equipment required by the new mobilization plan. Mobilization in the USSR proceeded extremely slowly. As a result, the war found the troops of the border military districts not fully mobilized and, as a result, not in full combat readiness."*
Between April and June 22, in an interval called the “particularly threatened period,” the Soviet government and NGOs accelerated the “slide toward war” by conducting covert strategic deployments of troops. This was, in essence, the first stage of an extended process of mobilization and deployment that would continue after the outbreak of war - ultimately until the second half of 1942. On April 26, the military councils of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the Far Eastern Front sent, by order of the General Staff, one mechanized corps, two rifle corps and two airborne brigades to the west. On May 10, the Ural Military District received an order to send two rifle divisions to the Baltic Special Military District, and through Five days later, the Siberian Military District received a similar order to send divisions to the Western and Kiev Special Military Districts.
On May 13, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov ordered the military districts to move 28 divisions, 9 corps headquarters and the headquarters of 4 armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) from internal districts to border ones. y). These troops were to assemble in positions along the Western Dvina and Dnieper: the 16th and 19th Armies as reinforcements for the Kyiv Special Military District, and the 21st and 22nd for the Western Special Military District. The movement of these armies began in May with orders to maintain a strict regime of camouflage and to deploy carefully and gradually, without creating any obviously abnormally heavy traffic on the railways. These armies were to complete their concentration in their assigned assembly areas between 1 and 10 June 1941 and form the second strategic echelon.
The May 13 directive also ordered the redeployment of formations from the Moscow, Volga, Siberian, Arkhangelsk, Oryol and Far Eastern military districts to form three additional armies (20th, 24th and 28th). Although the bulk of the 20th Army, primarily from the Oryol Military District, began to gather west of Moscow, the remaining armies had not yet begun to move by June 22, when the war began. Initially, all these armies were intended to be used as a strategic reserve - but with the outbreak of hostilities they became the core of the Reserve Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. Thus, the mobilization affected only seven armies and one mechanized corps. (For the departure and destination points of each mobilized unit, see Table 4.4).
Most of the formations in these reserve armies were understrength. Up to 80 percent of the divisions had reduced peacetime strength (closer to 6,000 than 14,800), and it was only when war actually began that they began to receive reservists and additional weapons, equipment and transport from wherever they could find them. Ultimately, most divisions were raised to 60 percent strength, but they still lacked many weapons and especially the vehicles needed to transport troops and supplies. This inability to bring the divisions to wartime levels was caused by a lack of equipment in the military districts and an incorrect assessment of the capabilities of the General Staff and the districts railway transport.
The most serious problem was precisely the underestimation bandwidth railways. According to the plan, the total volume of railway transport required to transport these forces was 939 trains, including 759 trains for rifle units, 105 for tanks, 50 for air units and 25 for artillery.
As of June 22, out of the planned 939 trains, 538,455 of them were still en route, and 83 had already been unloaded at their arrival points. Loading of the remaining trains continued until July 2, and unloading was completely completed only by July 14. By the beginning of the war, only 9 divisions of the second strategic echelon (19th Army) were concentrated in the areas allocated to them, and 19 divisions were on the way (16th, 21st and 22nd armies).
In addition to these covert troop movements, the NPO and the General Staff called up 793,000 conscripts under the guise of “large training camps” (BUS). This amount was actually equivalent to carrying out a partial covert mobilization. It made it possible to significantly provide personnel for approximately half of the existing rifle divisions, as well as fortified areas, artillery regiments of the RGK, Air Force, engineering troops, communications troops, air defense and logistics services. Since priority was given to rifle divisions, the most significant shortage of personnel was to be felt in the auxiliary troops. Although the orders given provided the troops with a significant amount of manpower, their full combat readiness was heavily dependent on weapons and combat equipment, which were in acute shortage.
The major setbacks at the front were partly caused by the German surprise attack, but were largely due to failures in planning and the inefficiency of the supply system, which was unable to provide the fighting forces with the required weapons and other important equipment. The failure of the transport mobilization system was especially catastrophic. The requisitioning of civilian trucks and tractors for military use was simply not carried out. As a result of all this, the alerted units were forced to move to the assembly areas using whatever means they could use - usually by rail or on foot. They could not take with them heavy weapons, artillery, fuel, ammunition, or even the necessary amount of food. This hit divisions moving to the front from internal military districts especially hard. Most had to leave equipment and supplies at the site, which later never arrived. Almost all divisions went into battle without the necessary equipment and supplies.
While the troops of the internal military districts were mobilizing, creating and deploying new units, the western military districts at the end of May finally began a limited regrouping of troops - within the strict framework imposed by Stalin. However, this regrouping was limited only to troops in the depths of the districts, so that the Germans would not perceive these movements as provocations. For example, on June 19, the commander of the Leningrad Military District transferred the 1st Tank Division from the Pskov region to Kandalaksha in central Karelia. On the same day, the Leningrad Military District transferred the 1st Infantry Division to the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District located near the border.
On June 15, the military districts received permission from the NPO and the General Staff, in accordance with existing defensive plans, to redeploy troops from the depths of the districts to more advanced positions. Some formations were transported by railway trains, but most, in order to maintain secrecy, moved on foot and at night. During this movement, the NKO categorically prohibited military district commanders from redeploying first-echelon troops or strengthening their forward positions.
At least one brave military district commander violated these regulations. On June 15, General F.I. Kuznetsov, commander of the Baltic Special Military District, alarmed by intelligence reports describing a threatening build-up of enemy troops along the border, issued detailed orders to increase combat readiness along the border. Without specifically mentioning German preparations for the attack, Kuznetsov criticized certain division commanders for laxity and negligence in maintaining combat readiness: “Today, more than ever, we must be in full combat readiness. Many commanders do not understand this. But this must be firmly and clearly understood by everyone.” , because at any moment we must be ready to carry out any combat mission." Kuznetsov then ordered the commanders to implement the prescribed passive measures to increase combat readiness and defense capability.
Later that same day, the Military Council of the District repeated measures to put troops on alert in a directive that began with the words: “In the event of an enemy violating the border, a surprise attack by large forces, or an air force crossing the border, I am establishing the following notification procedure...” Finally, on 18 June, upon receiving a lengthy, detailed and threatening intelligence report on June 17, Kuznetsov ordered his troops to be put on full combat readiness. The order, beginning with the words “In order to quickly bring the theater of military operations of the district to combat readiness, I ORDER...” - which specifically demanded full combat readiness from the district air defense, communications troops and ground transport systems, instructed the commanders of the 8th and 1st armies to prepare building bridges and laying mines, and gave orders to all other unit commanders to make proper preparations for defense. However, despite these bold actions on Kuznetsov's part, there is no evidence that the additional preparations he stimulated made the district's combat capability greater by the time the war began.
In general, the described measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of the border military districts failed. Although in the period immediately preceding the German attack, 33 divisions began to move from internal military districts to border districts, only 4-5 divisions managed to reach their new concentration areas. This, combined with the dispersal of district troops to a depth of 400 kilometers, doomed the troops to consistent defeat in parts. At the same time, in the strategic depths of the country, the Soviet command failed to timely deploy combat-ready troops with trained reserves. The planned formation and deployment of a strategic reserve of seven armies with 67 divisions was also chaotic and late. This, combined with the General Staff's incorrect analysis of where exactly the Germans would strike the main blow, doomed both the forward troops and strategic reserves to subsequent rapid defeat.
Mobilization also covered the enormous mass of logistics necessary to supply the fighting troops and prepare the theater of operations, especially in engineering terms. On the eve of the war, there were few or no rear services at the fronts and armies, and those services that were subordinate to field units or military districts were maintained on reduced peacetime staff. Therefore, MP-41 outlined the parameters for the mobilization of rear structures, demanding the formation of army rear service bodies in 7 days, front bodies in 15 days, and Air Force bodies in 5 days. This required the formation of 400-500 units and organizations of rear services at each front, including more than 100 for each army.
The mobilization plan required that "stable and permanent" front agencies maintain large reserves - from 9 to 10 rounds of ammunition, up to 10 fuel refills and a 30-day supply of food in addition to the three to six days supply in the troops. Although the general mobilization plan contained a separate “Rear Deployment Plan,” the effectiveness of this plan was greatly reduced by confusion over the responsibilities for planning and directing the rear services (on this, see Chapter 6). This resulted in shortages of key materials, especially transport, and in addition to the misdeployment of reserve stocks. Essentially, the logistics mobilization plan and the way it was carried out did not meet the requirements of troop mobilization and strategic deployment plans. As a result of service logistics support became the Achilles heel of the Soviets at the beginning of the war.
Engineering preparations for theater combat were also inadequate, partly due to flaws in planning and partly due to the shift of the Soviet border to the west in 1939 and 1940. The plan to build fortified areas and defensive structures along the border by 1941 was impossible to implement, and the hasty preparation of border defenses led to frustration in other aspects of the overall defensive plans. Special plans The restoration of the railway network and its extension to the new western borders were also not completed by the summer of 1941, since Soviet industry did not produce the required amount of rolled rail. The same applied to plans for the production of barbed wire and radio communications - by June 1941 they were only 75 percent completed.
“Thus, by the beginning of the war, the theater of military operations was not well prepared; this significantly slowed down the strategic deployment of troops and bringing troops in the border military districts to a state of combat readiness and had a negative impact on the course of defensive battles in the initial period of the war.”
Although plans for the mobilization and deployment of troops suffered from severe flaws, which led to a subsequent series of military disasters in the initial period of hostilities, by 1941 the Soviet personnel training system was able to create a total reserve of manpower of 14 million fighters. The mobilization system of the General Staff, with all its flaws, allowed the Red Army to create an amazing number of new armies, divisions and other formations in the initial period of the war. Ultimately, it was this system and the troops it produced in 1941 and later in 1942 that enabled the Red Army and the Soviet state to survive that initial period of the war and emerge victorious in 1945.
Statistics
Table 1. Personnel and territorial units of the Red Army
|
Rifle Corps |
||||
|
Rifle divisions |
||||
|
(regular) |
||||
|
Rifle divisions |
||||
|
(personnel) |
||||
|
Motorized booms |
||||
|
forged and mechanical |
||||
|
bathroom divisions |
||||
|
Cavalry corps |
||||
|
Cavalry divisions |
||||
|
Rifle brigades |
||||
|
Tank divisions |
||||
|
Tank corps |
||||
|
Fortified areas |
||||
|
Airborne |
||||
|
Airborne |
||||
|
The strength of the Red Army |
Mobilization required by MP-41
|
In peacetime |
According to MP-41 |
||
|
Front headquarters |
|||
|
Army headquarters |
|||
|
Rifle Corps Headquarters |
|||
|
Rifle divisions |
|||
|
Individual rifle |
|||
|
Mechanized Corps |
|||
|
Tank divisions |
|||
|
Motorized divisions |
|||
|
Cavalry corps |
|||
|
Separate airborne troops |
|||
|
nal brigades |
|||
|
Corps artillery |
|||
|
Artillery regiments of the RGK |
|||
|
Separate anti-tank |
|||
|
artillery brigades |
|||
|
Aviation corps |
|||
|
Aviation divisions |
|||
|
Aviation regiments |
Planned mobilization of strategic reserves", May-June 1941
|
Place of formation |
Arrival location |
|
|
16th Army |
Transbaikal Military District |
|
|
19th Army |
North Caucasian military district |
Cherkasy, Bila Tserkva |
|
25th mechanized |
Oryol military |
Mironovka |
|
ny corps (19th Army) |
||
|
20th Army |
Oryol military |
|
|
20th SK - Krnchev by 22 June; |
||
|
(Moscow Military District |
||
|
7th Mechanized |
Oryol military |
Orsha (Moscow military |
|
21st Army |
Volga military |
|
|
22nd Army |
Ural military |
|
|
24th Army (52nd |
Siberian military |
Nelidovo, White |
|
(Moscow Military District |
||
|
28th Army (30th |
Arkhangelsk |
Dorogobuzh, Yelnya, Zhukovka |
|
military district |
(Moscow Military District |
|
Mobilization plan
state documents defining the content, volume, procedure and timing of measures to transfer the country's economy, government bodies, local self-government and organizations to the mode of operation in wartime conditions, as well as the transfer of the Armed Forces and other troops to the organization and composition of wartime. In the Russian Federation, MPs are developed in accordance with the defense legislation. economy, armed forces, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces. formations.
EdwART. Glossary of terms of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, 2010
See what a “Mobilization Plan” is in other dictionaries:
Mobilization plan- a set of interconnected documents defining the content, volume, order and timing of measures for the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops, military formations and bodies, as well as those created for military... ... Border Dictionary
Mobilization plan (plan for the accounting year) of the economy- a set of mobilization documents that determine the content, volume, procedure and timing of measures in sectors and areas of the economy during the introduction of martial law, as well as the transfer of the economy and state and executive bodies... Official terminology
MOBILIZATIONAL, mobilization, mobilization. adj. to mobilization. Mobilization plan. Ushakov's explanatory dictionary. D.N. Ushakov. 1935 1940 ... Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary
mobilization- oh, oh. mobilization f. Rel. to mobilization. Mobilization plan. BAS 1. We were assigned to hospitals, infirmaries, regiments, to manage the mobilization lists. Veresaev In Japanese. war. Against the background of these successes of capitalism, real socialism with... ... Historical Dictionary of Gallicisms of the Russian Language
plan- A plan, a project for the implementation of something; exercise. About the breadth, scope, significance of the plan; about his assessment. Brilliant, important, great, magnificent, majestic, nationwide, comprehensive, all-encompassing, harmonious, general, grandiose, ... ... Dictionary of epithets
Mobilization plan- MOBILIZATION PLAN. See Mobilization... Military encyclopedia
The Russian Armed Forces request is redirected here; see also other meanings. Armed forces Russian Federation Armed Forces of Russia ... Wikipedia
Good afternoon. If the regional government allocates funds to an executive body for a set of mob. preparation (certification of the informatization object). Do we have the right to conclude a contract under clause 3, part 1, art. 93 (sole supplier)? Who should be involved as experts in this case? Is it necessary to conclude a contract with this organization in advance?
- Question: No. 531 dated: 2014-04-03.
In the above situation, I can only.
By virtue of clause 3, part 1 of Law 44-FZ, purchase from sole supplier(contractor, performer) can be carried out by the customer in the case of mobilization preparation work being carried out in the Russian Federation.
Certification of informatization objects is a set of organizational and technical measures, during which a multifaceted verification of an informatization object is carried out under real operating conditions in order to assess compliance with the required level of information security from leakage through technical channels.
In Russia there is Federal Law No. 31-FZ of February 26, 1997
“On mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation.”
According to Part 3 of Art. 2 Federal Law “On mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation” the content of mobilization preparation and mobilization includes:
1) normative legal regulation in the field of mobilization training and mobilization;
2) scientific and methodological support for mobilization preparation and mobilization;
3) determination of working conditions and preparation of state authorities, local governments and organizations for work during the period of mobilization and in wartime;
4) carrying out measures to transfer government bodies, local governments and organizations to work in wartime conditions;
5) preparation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces for mobilization;
6) carrying out the mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces;
7) development of mobilization plans for the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, mobilization plans for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces (hereinafter referred to as mobilization plans);
8) preparing the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, preparing organizations for work during the period of mobilization and in wartime;
9) carrying out measures to transfer the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, transfer of organizations to work in wartime conditions;
10) assessment of the state of mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation;
11) creation, development and preservation of mobilization capacities and facilities for the production of products necessary to meet the needs of the state, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces and the needs of the population in wartime;
12) creation and training of special formations intended, upon the announcement of mobilization, to be transferred to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or used in their interests, as well as in the interests of the economy of the Russian Federation;
13) preparation of equipment intended upon the announcement of mobilization for delivery to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special formations or use in their interests;
14) creation of reserves as part of the state material reserve material assets(including the stock of the mobilization reserve and the irreducible stock of the state material reserve) intended for the mobilization needs of the Russian Federation;
15) creation and preservation of an insurance fund for documentation for weapons and military equipment, the most important civilian products, high-risk objects, life support systems for the population and objects that are national treasures;
16) preparation and organization of rationed supplies of food and non-food products to the population, their medical care and provision of communications and transportation means during the period of mobilization and in wartime;
17) creation in the prescribed manner of reserve control points of state authorities, local government bodies and organizations and preparation of these control points for work in wartime conditions;
18) preparation of funds mass media to work during mobilization and wartime;
19) organization military registration in state authorities, local governments and organizations;
19.1) creation of a reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a reserve of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, a reserve Federal service security of the Russian Federation;
20) training of citizens in military specialties for recruitment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces during the period of mobilization and in wartime;
21) reservation for the period of mobilization and during wartime of citizens who are in the reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, federal executive bodies that have reserves (hereinafter referred to as citizens who are in reserve), and working in government bodies, local governments and organizations;
22) conducting exercises and training on mobilization deployment and implementation of mobilization plans;
23) advanced training of employees of mobilization bodies;
24) international cooperation in the field of mobilization preparation and mobilization.
Consequently, the first thing you need to pay attention to is whether the certification of an informatization object really relates to mobilization preparation and mobilization.
I draw attention to the above, because... upon further verification, if it is decided that the certification of an informatization object does not relate to mobilization preparation and mobilization, then the conclusion of a contract within the framework of clause 3, part 1, article 93 of Law 44-FZ will also be a violation.
If the certification of an informatization object relates to mobilization preparation and/or mobilization, then feel free to enter into a contract within the framework of clause 3, part 1, article 93 of Law 44-FZ.
The organization that will carry out the work must have special permits.
After work on certification of the informatization object is carried out, the Customer is issued a certificate of conformity after agreement with the Office of the State Technical Commission of Russia for the corresponding federal district.
My personal opinion is that a certificate of conformity will be sufficient as an expert opinion.
If the work is not completed or is performed poorly, a certificate of conformity will not be issued.
Therefore, there is no point in producing documents in the form of a certificate of conformity.
Attention! The information provided in the article is current at the time of publication.
Mobilization preparation
a set of measures carried out in peacetime to prepare in advance the economy, state authorities and local self-government, the armed forces and the territory of the state to ensure its protection from an armed attack; component defense organizations of the Russian Federation. The main goal of M.p. - ensuring a guaranteed transfer of the country's economy, government bodies, local self-government and organizations to work in wartime conditions, and the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces - to the organizational structure and composition of wartime; planning and implementation of civil and territorial defense activities. Organization and order of M.p. government bodies, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces. formations are determined by regulatory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation. Organization and order of M.p. the economy of the Russian Federation, as well as organizations, are determined by regulatory legal acts of the Government of the Russian Federation (see Mobilization preparation of the economy).
EdwART. Glossary of terms of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, 2010
See what “Mobilization training” is in other dictionaries:
Mobilization preparation- (English: mobilization preparation) in the Russian Federation, a set of measures carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, constituent entities of the Russian Federation and municipalities, preparation of state authorities, local self-government and ... Encyclopedia of Law
MOBILIZATION PREPARATION- a set of measures carried out in peacetime to prepare in advance the economy, state authorities and local self-government, the population and armed forces, and the territory of the state to ensure its protection from armed... ... Legal encyclopedia
MOBILIZATION PREPARATION- in accordance with the Federal Law on mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation of February 26, 1997, M. p. is understood as a set of measures carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation,... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary constitutional law
Mobilization preparation- 1) a set of measures carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, (subjects of the Russian Federation, municipalities), government bodies (local governments) and organizations, the Armed Forces, others... ... Border Dictionary
Mobilization preparation- a set of activities carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, the preparation of government bodies, local governments and... ... Civil protection. Conceptual and terminological dictionary
Mobilization preparation- (eng. mobilization preparation) in the Russian Federation, a set of measures carried out in peacetime, for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, constituent entities of the Russian Federation and municipalities, preparation of state authorities, local government and organizations ... Large legal dictionary
Mobilization preparation- 1. Mobilization preparation in the Russian Federation is understood as a set of measures carried out in peacetime to prepare in advance the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy... ... Official terminology
Mobilization preparation- this is a set of measures carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the country’s economy, government bodies, local governments and organizations, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and... ... Administrative procedural law: dictionary of terms and concepts
A set of measures carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, the preparation of government bodies, local governments and organizations, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and created...
A set of activities carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of civil defense forces (troops and civilian civil defense organizations), their command and control bodies for action in wartime. EdwART. Dictionary of terms of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, 2010 ... Dictionary of emergency situations
Books
- Disaster medicine. Textbook. Grif Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Pavel Kolesnichenko, Alexander Loschakov, Sergei Stepovich, Konstantin Kotenko, Natalya Amosova, Denis Timashkov. The textbook is developed in accordance with the federal state educational standard for higher educational institutions. It is presented in three sections: mobilization preparation...
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