History of creation
Battlecruisers were to be used as part of a high-speed detachment of the main forces in a squadron battle. They were assigned the role of a freely maneuvering force, capable of carrying out deep tactical reconnaissance and covering the head of the enemy squadron.
356 mm turret installations
In the tenth years of the 20th century, an increase in the main caliber became the main argument of artillery in the confrontation between “armor and projectile”. In England, Japan, and America, ships with gun calibers of 343 mm, 356 mm, 381 mm and more are beginning to appear. In October 1911, the Naval Ministry organized a competition for turret designs; it was assumed that each of the future cruisers would be armed with four 356-mm three-gun turrets, with a rate of fire of three salvoes per minute without taking into account aiming. Five factories took part in the competition: three St. Petersburg factories - Metallichesky, Obukhovsky and Putilovsky, as well as the Society of Nikolaev Factories and Shipyards (ONZiV) and the English Vickers plant. The competition was won by the Metal Plant with a project developed by the famous engineer A. G. Dukelsky. The mechanical part of the turret installations was developed on the basis of 305-mm turret installations for battleships of the Sevastopol type; to reduce weight, the gun was installed for the first time without the so-called “shirt”, directly in the clip. Nevertheless, the weight of the gun, compared to the 305 mm, increased from 50.7 to 83.8 tons. To increase the coasting speed, a coasting regulator and a coasting buffer were used. The roof of the tower was assembled from 125 mm armor plates, the walls of the tower from sheets 300 mm thick.
History of construction
On October 12, 1912, the ships ordered to the Baltic Shipyard received the names “Izmail” and “Kinburn”, and to the Admiralty - “Borodino” and “Navarin”. On December 6, after the ceremonial laying, the cruisers were officially included in the lists of the fleet, although the theoretical drawing of their hull had not yet been finally approved.
Design
In terms of armament, the Izmail-class battlecruisers were significantly superior to their contemporary dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. Most foreign battleships and battlecruisers were inferior to them in number, caliber and weight of the broadside, up to the "Washington" type battleships Rodney. The only rivals in terms of armament for the Izmails were American “standard” battleships. In terms of protection, the Izmails were inferior to most of their contemporary battleships - their armor was penetrated at most combat distances by 305 mm shells. Due to their superiority in speed and weapons, they could only count on success in a short-lived battle or a timely retreat. Comparing the Izmails with battlecruisers of other countries, especially English ones, generally loses its meaning - such is the superiority of Russian cruisers in armament.
In August 1913, the results of full-scale tests were obtained from the shooting of the “excluded ship No. 4” (the former battleship “Chesma”), on which elements of the armor protection of the new battleships were mounted, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. It turned out that the armor belt was penetrated by 305-mm shells at distances of 85-90 cable lengths - individual plates were pressed in, and the outer side was “broken out” even in cases where the armor plates were not penetrated; The flooring of the upper deck was destroyed, and the middle deck was destroyed by its fragments. On the Izmails already under construction, we had to limit ourselves to improving the armor plate fastening systems, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt and changing the weight distribution of the horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks.
By August 1914, the readiness by weight of the hull installed and being processed was 43% for Izmail, 38% for Kinburn, 30% for Borodin, and 20% for Navarina. The pace of construction lagged behind the approved schedules due to delays in the supply of materials and castings. Already on May 22, 1914, the launch dates of the first two ships were postponed to October of the same year. With the beginning of the war, there was a disruption in the supply of main caliber turrets. Some of the castings and forgings, mortars and propeller shaft brackets, manufactured in Germany, had to be ordered from the already overloaded factories of the Maritime Department. According to the new deadlines approved on December 20, the launch of the first two cruisers was postponed to May, the second to September 1915, and readiness for testing was postponed to May and August 1917, respectively, that is, a year behind schedule.
On the morning of June 9, 1915, the lead ship of the series, Izmail, was launched. On June 11, the Borodino was launched, and on October 17, the Kinburn. In accordance with the new classification announced by the Maritime Department on June 27, ships of the Izmail type were included in the class of battlecruisers.
After the three ships were launched construction work almost completely stopped. Only in the spring of 1916, all pre-launch work on the Navarin was urgently completed and on October 27, 1916, the cruiser launched.
As of April 15, 1917, the readiness of the cruisers Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin was as follows: in terms of hull, systems and devices - 65, 57, 52 and 50%; for already installed belt and deck armor - 36, 13, 5, 2%; for mechanisms - 66, 40, 22, 26.5%, for boilers - 66, 38.4, 7.2 and 2.5%. The completion date for the Izmail towers was postponed to the end of 1919, and the remaining ships to the next year. In the summer of 1917, a congress of shipyard workers, which decided to continue the construction of Izmail, at least for the sake of earning money, expressed a desire to convert the remaining ships of this type into commercial ships. In the preliminary studies, two conversion options were outlined: into cargo (or oil) ships with a carrying capacity of 16,000 tons and into oil barges (22,000 tons).
At the end of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to suspend the construction of a number of ships, including the Izmail series. During the Civil War, the hulls of battlecruisers remained near the walls of the factories. On July 19, 1923, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were excluded from the lists of the fleet, and on August 21, the ships were acquired “in their entirety” by the German company Alfred Kubats. On September 26, tugboats arrived in Petrograd for the Kinburn, and later for the other two. Boilers, machinery and other ship equipment were used in national economy, partly during the repair and modernization of the remaining warships in service.
Several options have been put forward for completing the Izmail, including conversion into an aircraft carrier. This project arose in March 1925. It was planned to equip the ship with powerful artillery weapons and an air group consisting of 12 torpedo bombers, 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 artillery markers. The approximate displacement was 20,000-22,000 tons. The project was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A.I. Rykov on July 6, 1925. However, on March 16, 1926, a commission headed by I. S. Unshlikht stopped all work, and Izmail was scrapped.
In the early 30s, the cruiser's hull was dismantled. Some of the boilers were installed on battleship"Gangut". Three main caliber guns were mounted on specially designed railway transporters; after successful tests in 1932-1933. they were included in the artillery coastal defense Baltic Fleet. During the siege of Leningrad, they successfully fired at the Nazis' manpower, equipment and defensive structures.
Notes / With a foreword by M. Pavlovich.. - Moscow: State Military Publishing House, 1926. - 272 p.
Battlecruiser "Izmail"
Fast battleship ( Overall rating project)
So, what were the most powerful ships of the Russian Imperial Navy? The attentive reader has already noticed that in this work, in relation to the Izmailovs, their official classification - “battle cruisers” - was almost never used. This is no coincidence. Conceived in 1910 as a classic armored cruiser, Izmail, as its project developed, became one of the most powerful battleships in the world with an advanced operational-tactical concept. This concept is a fast battleship, the need for which became apparent during the First World War. It was the fast battleships that became the successors to the classic super-dreadnoughts, and Ishmael in some way anticipated their appearance.
What qualities of the Russian ship's design indicate this? First of all, the composition of its main artillery. Russian dreadnoughts in those years had the “longest sword” - the most powerful and numerous heavy artillery among their brothers. The superiority of the Izmail in firepower over the super-dreadnought battleships of other fleets looks very impressive. Thus, the British battleships "Orion", "King George V" and "Iron Duke" (10 13.5 "/45 guns each), as well as the American "New York", "Nevada" and "Arizona" (10 14 "/45 guns) had a salvo weight of 6350 kg (70% of Izmail); British "Queen Elizabeth", "Royal Sovereign" and Italian "Caracciolo" (8 15"/42 guns each) -6976 kg (78% of "Ishmael"); American "New Mexico" and "California" (12 14" each /50 guns), as well as Japanese “Fuso” and “Ise” (12 14"/45 guns) -7620 kg (85% of Izmail). Thus, the “sword” of Russian super-dreadnoughts actually turned out to be 15 - 30% more powerful than all battleships built between 1911 and 1919, and even surpassed the ships of the next generation - the 16" battleships Maryland, Nagato and Nelson (respectively 85, 89 and 91% of the weight of the Izmail salvo).
But perhaps “Izmail” lagged behind its foreign counterparts in terms of the muzzle energy of its guns? Calculations show that here, too, the Russian 14"/52 system was significantly ahead of all analogues: the power of the American 14"/45, 14"/50, British 13.5"/45, 15"/42, Japanese 14"/45 and Italian 15 "/40 guns were, respectively, 79, 91, 72, 96, 74 and 85% of the power of the 14" guns of the Russian super-dreadnought. This, taking into account the superiority in the weight of the salvo, gives an excess of its total muzzle energy (that is, the total power of the salvo) from 10 to 76% over the battleships listed above.
However, it would be wrong to consider the Izmail a rearmed but underprotected ship. Of interest are the results of calculations of the comparative stability of the Izmail reservation system and its most powerful foreign contemporaries. Let's start with Queen Elizabeth. Calculations show that the stability of the vertical protection of the Russian and English battleships (taking into account possible ways penetrating projectile against six different combinations of armor barriers) is approximately the same, but in terms of horizontal protection, the Ishmael (38+60 mm) is more stable than the Queen Elizabeth (25+32+25 mm). The difference gives a horizontal safety zone of 15 kbt for a Russian ship. Of course, this is not a very fundamental advantage, since the Izmail moving at a 25-knot speed, keeping the enemy at a heading angle of 45°, covers such a distance in 5 minutes. But here the one and a half superiority over the “British” in the number of heavy guns helps out, and the entire duel, thus, can be considered with the advantage of the Russian battleship “on points”.
Unlike the fast Queen Elizabeth, the battle with the 22-knot Bayern develops differently. Its horizontal defense is vulnerable to a 14"/52 gun from a distance of 53 kbt, while both decks of the Russian ship are penetrated by a German 15"/45 gun from only 76 kbt. “Ishmael” confidently commands the distance and has the ability to force a battle on its slow opponent at sharp angles (to compensate for the difference in vertical protection) in the range of 53 - 76 kbt to inflict decisive damage through the decks. Considering that the weight of the shells of both artillery systems is the same (748 and 750 kg), and the Russian battleship has one and a half superiority in the number of guns, such tactics, subject to freedom of maneuver, could lead to a good result.
The Japanese battleships of the Fuso - Ise series, generally repeating their British ancestors in terms of the type of armor, were inferior to them in its thickness, but were somewhat superior to the Queen Elizabeth in artillery power, so in general the picture of their confrontation with the Ishmael was not different from the above. Comparison with the Italian “Caracciolo” with its narrow 300-mm belt, 46-mm armor on two decks and being inferior in artillery by more than a third is completely not in favor of the latter. The only “impenetrable” enemy for the “Izmail” is the 21-knot American “chests”, starting with the “New York”, and the last five ships of the “family” with 12 14"/50 guns almost reach it in weight and salvo power Having abandoned the hope of sinking these slow-moving and excellently armored “rafts” with armor-piercing shells (sides with a total thickness of 343 - 356 mm and decks of 120-150 mm), the only option remains is to try to disable them with high-explosive shells, sweeping away all the superstructures and destroying the unarmored side. at the extremities.
So, before us is a heavy armored ship, quite adequate as a “strike-defense” system to all super-dreadnought battleships of its day, but much more tactically flexible. In the context of this conclusion, comparison of the Izmail with the British, German and Japanese battlecruisers, in general, loses its meaning (Against the background of the Russian super-dreadnought, only the unfinished German Mackensen and Ersatz York look relatively good, having approximately the same speed, similar to the horizontal protection and thicker side armor, but significantly inferior to the Izmail in firepower. As for the British Lion and Repulse, the superiority of the Russian ship looks overwhelming: with more powerful armor, it surpassed the British in salvo weight, respectively. by 77% and 72%). Therefore, there is every reason to classify the Russian ship as a fast battleship. As a matter of fact, this essence of his was never particularly hidden. If you carefully study the program documents of the Moscow General Staff, you can clearly see that from the very beginning they had a very clear idea of what was behind the discreet term “armored (or “battle”) cruiser.” Already in the note submitted by the Moscow State School to the Duma on March 5, 1912, “On the issue of the program for enhanced shipbuilding in 1912 - 1916.” about the future “armored cruisers” it was directly stated: “These cruisers are only a type of battleship, not inferior to the latter in terms of artillery armament, armor, and superior to their speed and area of operation.” Very remarkable wording! The policy document on the development of the country's naval forces for the five years ahead directly interprets the “cruisers” included in it as fast battleships. Gradually, the majority of domestic specialists in the history of shipbuilding and the fleet are inclined to this conclusion.
But if Izmail is a strategic fast battleship, then how can this conclusion be related to its proclaimed construction for the shallow Baltic? Why was it necessary to create highly mobile and superbly armed super-dreadnoughts for a limited closed theater, where they would look, in the words of British researcher K. McBride, “like whales in a pool”? The fact is that Russian strategic naval planning never considered this valuable division as a detachment for use exclusively in the Baltic Fleet. In the conditions of the rapidly changing situation of that time, their purpose officially defined by the program would most likely remain on paper. "Izmail" was to become the first heavy formation of the "free sea power", designed to ensure the interests of the empire with its presence in any given area of the world. Already in the spring of 1914, the head of the Moscow General Staff, Admiral A.I. Rusin, during a visit to France to coordinate the actions of the fleets in the event of a pan-European war, decided with the allied naval command the issue of transferring the Izmailov to the Mediterranean Sea. Before equipping their own base in the Aegean Sea, Russian super-dreadnoughts had to be based either on Bizerte, leased in 1913, or on Toulon, where the French side undertook to build a separate equipped base for them. In the event that the united fleets of Austria-Hungary and Italy acted against the Entente, the “Ismails” were supposed to form a high-speed heavy division of the French Mediterranean Fleet. A commander had even already been designated for it - Rear Admiral M.M. Veselkin.
Why then, during the entire construction period, did the Navy Ministry persistently call these ships “cruisers”? The answer is simple: in May 1912, the most important task of the moment was to squeeze out of the Duma members, who exactly a year ago had forked out money for seven battleships at once, for allocations for a new grandiose (costing a quarter of the entire country's budget!) naval program, and the Moscow State School understood perfectly well that it would be headed by four new battleships meant obviously dooming the matter to failure. Therefore, when I.K. Grigorovich frightened the silent hall of the Tauride Palace with the prospect of the entire German fleet appearing within 24 hours after the declaration of war, almost under the windows of the Winter Palace, and demanded money from legislators for “cruisers,” he acted absolutely correctly. He most likely would not have received funds for battleships, and what kind of ships the financed “armored cruisers” would actually become was up to the sailors to decide.
Let's summarize. For the history of shipbuilding and the fleet, juggling terms is not so important. The point is different. While maintaining continuity in the idea of powerful weapons, advanced hull design and type of armor, the Izmail received further development line to improve the heavy artillery ship, which culminated, as in the British Navy, with the creation of an original type of high-speed battleship: in England they came to it by “accelerating” the squadron battleship, and in Russia - by strengthening the squadron cruiser.
But Izmail, as a world-class strategic naval weapons system, still represented a very difficult task for the Russian industry, which at that time did not have a sufficiently powerful potential for its implementation. Hence the need to attract foreign counterparties, which ultimately turned out to be fatal. Had the peace lasted at least another year, the completion of the Izmailov would have entered an irreversible phase, since the end of all foreign deliveries for the ships of the series should have been completed no later than the spring of 1915. Of course, it would hardly have been possible to avoid an approximately one-year delay in entry into service compared to the original date, but even in mid-1917 it would have been the strongest battleship division in the world and would have remained so for many years to come. But the outbreak of war in July 1914 affected the progress of work in the most fatal way. And one can only regret that these wonderful ships, which the fleet of any maritime power could be proud of, never had to go out into the ocean.
During the war, the Russian Navy Ministry began to reconsider the development strategy of the navy. Inspired by how easily the Japanese squadrons captured the head of the Russian squadrons in Tsushima and the Yellow Sea, the authors of the third generation dreadnought project relied on speed and firepower, thereby creating the domestic concept of the battlecruiser.
Battlecruisers were to be used as part of a high-speed detachment of the main forces in a squadron battle. They were assigned the role of a freely maneuvering force, capable of carrying out deep tactical reconnaissance and covering the head of the enemy squadron.
In the tenth years of the 20th century, an increase in the main caliber became the main argument of artillery in the confrontation between “armor and projectile”. In England, Japan, and America, ships with gun calibers of 343 mm, 356 mm, 381 mm and more are beginning to appear. In October 1911, the Navy Ministry organized a competition for turret designs; it was assumed that each of the future cruisers would be armed with four 356-mm three-gun turrets, with a rate of fire of three salvoes per minute without taking into account aiming. Five factories took part in the competition: three St. Petersburg factories - Metallichesky, Obukhovsky and Putilovsky, as well as the Society of Nikolaev Factories and Shipyards (ONZiV) and the English Vickers plant. The competition was won by the Metal Plant with a project developed by the famous engineer A. G. Dukelsky. The mechanical part of the turret installations was developed on the basis of 305-mm turret installations for battleships of the Sevastopol type; to reduce weight, the gun was installed for the first time without the so-called “shirt”, directly in the clip. Nevertheless, the weight of the gun, compared to the 305 mm, increased from 50.7 to 83.8 tons. To increase the coasting speed, a coasting regulator and a coasting buffer were used. The roof of the tower was assembled from 125 mm armor plates, the walls of the tower from sheets 300 mm thick.
On October 12, 1912, the ships ordered to the Baltic Shipyard received the names “Izmail” and “Kinburn”, and to the Admiralty - “Borodino” and “Navarin”. On December 6, after the ceremonial laying, the cruisers were officially included in the lists of the fleet, although the theoretical drawing of their hull had not yet been finally approved.
In terms of armament, the Izmail-class battlecruisers were significantly superior to their contemporary dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. Most foreign battleships and battlecruisers were inferior to them in number, caliber and weight of the broadside, up to the "Washington" type battleships Rodney. The only rivals in terms of armament for the Izmails were American “standard” battleships. In terms of protection, the Izmails were inferior to most of their contemporary battleships - their armor was penetrated at most combat distances by 305 mm shells. Due to their superiority in speed and weapons, they could only count on success in a short-lived battle or a timely retreat. Comparing the Izmails with battlecruisers of other countries, especially English ones, generally loses its meaning - such is the superiority of Russian cruisers in armament.
In August 1913, the results of full-scale tests were obtained from the shooting of the “excluded ship No. 4” (the former battleship “Chesma”), on which elements of the armor protection of the new battleships were mounted, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. It turned out that the armor belt was penetrated by 305-mm shells at distances of 85-90 cable lengths - individual plates were pressed in, and the outer side was “broken out” even in cases where the armor plates were not penetrated; The flooring of the upper deck was destroyed, and the middle deck was destroyed by its fragments. On the Izmails already under construction, we had to limit ourselves to improving the armor plate fastening systems, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt and changing the weight distribution of the horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks.
By August 1914, the readiness by weight of the hull installed and being processed was 43% for Izmail, 38% for Kinburn, 30% for Borodin, and 20% for Navarina. The pace of construction lagged behind the approved schedules due to delays in the supply of materials and castings. Already on May 22, 1914, the launch dates of the first two ships were postponed to October of the same year. With the beginning of the war, there was a disruption in the supply of main caliber turrets. Some of the castings and forgings, mortars and propeller shaft brackets, manufactured in Germany, had to be ordered from the already overloaded factories of the Maritime Department. According to the new deadlines approved on December 20, the launch of the first two cruisers was postponed to May, the second to September 1915, and readiness for testing was postponed to May and August 1917, respectively, that is, a year behind schedule.
On the morning of June 9, 1915, the lead ship of the series, Izmail, was launched. On June 11, the Borodino was launched, and on October 17, the Kinburn. In accordance with the new classification announced by the Maritime Department on June 27, ships of the Izmail type were included in the class of battlecruisers.
After the launch of the three ships, construction work almost completely stopped. Only in the spring of 1916, all pre-launch work on the Navarin was urgently completed and on October 27, 1916, the cruiser launched.
As of April 15, 1917, the readiness of the cruisers Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin was as follows: in terms of hull, systems and devices - 65, 57, 52 and 50%; for already installed belt and deck armor - 36, 13, 5, 2%; for mechanisms - 66, 40, 22, 26.5%, for boilers - 66, 38.4, 7.2 and 2.5%. The completion date for the Izmail towers was postponed to the end of 1919, and the remaining ships to the next year. In the summer of 1917, a congress of shipyard workers, which decided to continue the construction of Izmail, at least for the sake of earning money, expressed a desire to convert the remaining ships of this type into commercial ships. In the preliminary studies, two conversion options were outlined: into cargo (or oil) ships with a carrying capacity of 16,000 tons and into oil barges (22,000 tons).
At the end of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to suspend the construction of a number of ships, including the Izmail series. During the Civil War, the hulls of battlecruisers remained near the walls of the factories. On July 19, 1923, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were excluded from the lists of the fleet, and on August 21, the ships were acquired “in their entirety” by the German company Alfred Kubats. On September 26, tugboats arrived in Petrograd for the Kinburn, and later for the other two. Boilers, mechanisms and other ship equipment were used in the national economy, partly during the repair and modernization of the remaining warships in service.
Several options have been put forward for completing the Izmail, including conversion into an aircraft carrier. This project arose in March 1925. It was planned to equip the ship with powerful artillery weapons and an air group consisting of 12 torpedo bombers, 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 artillery markers. The approximate displacement was 20,000-22,000 tons. The project was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A.I. Rykov on July 6, 1925. However, on March 16, 1926, a commission headed by I. S. Unshlikht stopped all work, and Izmail was scrapped.
In the early 30s, the cruiser's hull was dismantled. Some of the boilers were installed on the battleship Gangut. Three main caliber guns were mounted on specially designed railway transporters; after successful tests in 1932-1933. they were included in the coastal defense artillery of the Baltic Fleet. During the siege of Leningrad, they successfully fired at the Nazis' manpower, equipment and defensive structures.
Code:m1342
Main Features
Displacement 32,500 tons (full)
Length 223.85 m
Width 30.5 m
Draft 8.81 m
Reservation 237 mm - main armor belt, 125 mm - extremities, 75-100 mm - upper belt between the middle and upper decks, 100 mm - traverses, 200-300 mm - towers, wheelhouse: 250 mm (roof), 300 mm (base ), 400 mm (above the middle deck)
Engines 7 boilers
Power 66,000 l. With. (full),
70,000 l. With. (largest)
Speed 26.5 knots (full),
27.5 knots (highest)
Crew 1645 people
Armament
Artillery 12 × 356 mm guns,
24 × 130 mm
Anti-aircraft artillery 4 × 63 mm
After Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Navy Ministry began to reconsider the strategy for the development of the navy. Inspired by how easily the Japanese squadrons captured the head of the Russian squadrons in Tsushima and the Yellow Sea, the authors of the project of the third generation of dreadnoughts relied on speed and firepower, thereby creating a domestic concept of a battlecruiser.
Battlecruisers were to be used as part of a high-speed detachment of the main forces in a squadron battle. They were assigned the role of a freely maneuvering force, capable of carrying out deep tactical reconnaissance and covering the head of the enemy squadron. By order of October 23, 1907, the Council of Ministers put into effect the “Regulations on the composition and division of the fleet,” according to which “an operationally capable squadron” Russian fleet was to consist of eight battleships, four armored ships, nine light cruisers and 36 destroyers. The task of creating such a squadron was put forward as a priority in the project “Programs for the development of the Russian naval armed forces for 1909-1919” developed by the Naval General Staff.
On May 15, 1910, Naval Minister S.A. Voevodsky approved the “Tasks for developing elements for the design of armored cruisers” drawn up by the Naval General Staff, after which the Naval Technical Committee (MTK) began development. First estimates showed that with minimal armament (8 x 305 mm guns), the ships' displacement will be 28,000 tons, the main dimensions will be 204 x 27 x 8.8 m, the given speed (28 knots) will require boosting the boilers and turbine power of 80,000 hp. With. (specific gravity of the power plant 67 kg/hp.)
The task of increasing offensive power led to a rapid increase in the caliber and number of guns, as a result of which the size of the cruiser increased significantly. Some points of the task turned out to be impossible, so on December 24, 1910, the navigation area was halved, and the elevation angle of the guns was reduced to 25°.
On August 26, 1911, the Naval Ministry sent out proposals to six Russian and seventeen of the most famous foreign shipbuilding enterprises to submit preliminary designs for armored cruisers to the competition in accordance with the attached requirements. The projects accepted for consideration were distinguished by great diversity both in armament and armor, and in power plants: 305 mm or 356 mm main caliber artillery, three or four three-gun turrets, twenty to twenty-four 130 mm guns, fifteen to forty-eight boilers, two to four propeller shafts.
The idea of a linearly elevated arrangement of towers at the ends of the ship was immediately rejected, and the idea of installing four three-gun towers, on the contrary, aroused keen interest, but the limits on spending funds allocated for construction had already been exhausted. As a result, the developers from the Admiralty and Baltic factories had to sacrifice 1 speed knot and 12 mm of side armor. However, there was still not enough money, so the missing amounts were taken from funds for the construction of light cruisers of the Svetlana class.
Regarding the offensive power of the Izmail, the theory of artillery fire used in the construction of these ships is of interest. A dreadnought with 8 or 10 main battery guns can fire 2 salvoes of 4 or 5 guns in a certain period of time. A dreadnought, having 12 guns in four turrets, with the same rate of fire, can fire three salvos, that is, fire 1.5 times more intensely.
History of construction[edit | edit source text]
On August 4, 1912, the Minister of Navy approved the drawings " common project" On September 5, 1912, the Admiralty and Baltic factories received orders for the construction of battle cruisers (two each), with the first two being ready for testing on July 1, and the second on September 1, 1916. I. I. Bobrov was appointed senior ship builder.
On October 12, 1912, the ships ordered to the Baltic Shipyard received the names "Izmail" and "Kinburn", and to the Admiralty - "Borodino" and "Navarin". On December 6, after the ceremonial laying, the cruisers were officially included in the lists of the fleet, although the theoretical drawing of their hull had not yet been finally approved.
Design[edit | edit source text]
In terms of armament, the Izmail-class battlecruisers were significantly superior to their contemporary dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. Most foreign battleships and battlecruisers were inferior to them in number, caliber and weight of the broadside, up to the “Washington” Rodney-class battleships. The only rivals in terms of armament for the Izmails were American “standard” battleships. In terms of protection, the Izmails were inferior to most of their contemporary battleships - their armor was penetrated at most combat distances by 305 mm shells. Due to their superiority in speed and weapons, they could only count on success in a short-lived battle or a timely retreat. Comparing the Izmails with battlecruisers of other countries, especially with the British, generally loses its meaning - such is the superiority of Russian cruisers in armament.
In August 1913, the results of full-scale tests were obtained from the shooting of the “excluded ship No. 4” (the former battleship “Chesma”), on which elements of the armor protection of the new battleships were mounted, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. It turned out that the armor belt was penetrated by 305-mm shells at distances of 85-90 cable lengths - individual plates were pressed in, and the outer side was “broken out” even in cases where the armor plates were not penetrated; The flooring of the upper deck was destroyed, and the middle deck was destroyed by its fragments. On the Izmails already under construction, we had to limit ourselves to improving the armor plate fastening systems, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt and changing the weight distribution of the horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks.
By August 1914, the readiness by weight of the hull installed and being processed was 43% for Izmail, 38% for Kinburn, 30% for Borodin, and 20% for Navarina. The pace of construction lagged behind the approved schedules due to delays in the supply of materials and castings. Already on May 22, 1914, the launch dates of the first two ships were postponed to October of the same year. With the beginning of the war, there was a disruption in the supply of main caliber turrets. Some of the castings and forgings, mortars and propeller shaft brackets, manufactured in Germany, had to be ordered from the already overloaded factories of the Maritime Department. According to the new schedules approved on December 20, the launch of the first two cruisers was postponed to May, the second to September 1915, and readiness for testing was postponed to May and August 1917, respectively, that is, a year behind schedule.
On the morning of June 9, 1915, the lead ship of the series, Izmail, was launched. On June 11, the Borodino was launched, and on October 17, the Kinburn. In accordance with the new classification announced by the Maritime Department on June 27, ships of the Izmail type were included in the class of battlecruisers.
After the launch of the three ships, construction work almost completely stopped. Only in the spring of 1916, all pre-launch work on the Navarin was urgently completed and on October 27, 1916, the cruiser launched.
As of April 15, 1917, the readiness of the cruisers Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin was as follows: in terms of hull, systems and devices - 65, 57, 52 and 50%; for already installed belt and deck armor - 36, 13, 5, 2%; for mechanisms - 66, 40, 22, 26.5%, for boilers - 66, 38.4, 7.2 and 2.5%. The completion date for the Izmail towers was postponed to the end of 1919, and the remaining ships to the next year. In the summer of 1917, a congress of shipyard workers, which decided to continue the construction of Izmail, at least for the sake of earning money, expressed a desire to convert the remaining ships of this type into commercial ships. In the preliminary studies, two conversion options were outlined: into cargo (or oil) ships with a carrying capacity of 16,000 tons and into oil barges (22,000 tons).
At the end of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to suspend the construction of a number of ships, including the Izmail series. During the Civil War, the hulls of battlecruisers remained near the walls of the factories. On July 19, 1923, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were excluded from the lists of the fleet, and on August 21, the ships were acquired “in their entirety” by the German company Alfred Kubats. On September 26, tugboats arrived in Petrograd for the Kinburn, and later for the other two. Boilers, mechanisms and other ship equipment were used in the national economy, partly for the repair and modernization of the remaining warships in service.
Several options have been put forward for completing the Izmail, including conversion into an aircraft carrier. This project arose in March 1925. It was planned to equip the ship with powerful artillery weapons and an air group consisting of 12 torpedo bombers, 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 artillery markers. The approximate displacement was 20,000-22,000 tons. The project was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A.I. Rykov on July 6, 1925. However, on March 16, 1926, a commission headed by I. S. Unshlikht stopped all work, and Izmail was scrapped.
In the early 30s, the cruiser's hull was dismantled. Some of the boilers were installed on the battleship Gangut. Three main caliber guns were mounted on specially designed railway transporters; after successful tests in 1932-1933. they were included in the coastal defense artillery of the Baltic Fleet. During the siege of Leningrad, they successfully fired at the Nazis' manpower, equipment and defensive structures.
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| Izmail-class battlecruisers | |
|---|---|
| Project | |
| Country | |
| Manufacturers |
|
| Years of construction | 1912-1917 |
| Planned | 4 |
| Canceled | 4 |
| Sent for scrapping | Sold for scrap to a private German company in 1923 |
| Main Features | |
| Displacement | 32,500 tons (full) |
| Length | 223.85 m |
| Width | 30.5 m |
| Draft | 8.81 m |
| Booking | 237 mm - main armor belt, 125 mm - extremities, 75-100 mm - upper belt between the middle and upper decks, 100 mm - traverses, 200-300 mm - towers, wheelhouse: 250 mm (roof), 300 mm (base) , 400 mm (above average deck) |
| Engines | 7 boilers |
| Power | 66,000 l. With. (full), 70,000 l. With. (largest) |
| Travel speed | 26.5 knots (full), 27.5 knots (highest) |
| Crew | 1645 people |
| Armament | |
| Artillery | 12 × 356 mm guns, 24 × 130 mm |
| Flak | 4 × 63 mm |
Izmail-class battlecruisers- a type of Russian battlecruisers of the first quarter of the 20th century.
History of creation
Battlecruisers were to be used as part of a high-speed detachment of the main forces in a squadron battle. They were assigned the role of a freely maneuvering force, capable of carrying out deep tactical reconnaissance and covering the head of the enemy squadron. By order of October 23, 1907, the Council of Ministers put into effect the “Regulations on the composition and division of the fleet,” according to which an “operational squadron” of the Russian fleet was to consist of eight battleships, four armored ships, nine light cruisers and 36 destroyers. The task of creating such a squadron was put forward as a priority in the project “Programs for the development of the Russian naval armed forces for 1909-1919” developed by the Naval General Staff.
356 mm turret installations
In the tenth years of the 20th century, an increase in the main caliber became the main argument of artillery in the confrontation between “armor and projectile”. In England, Japan, and America, ships with gun calibers of 343 mm, 356 mm, 381 mm and more are beginning to appear. In October 1911, the Navy Ministry organized a competition for turret designs; it was assumed that each of the future cruisers would be armed with four 356 mm three-gun turrets, with a rate of fire of three salvoes per minute without taking into account aiming. Five factories took part in the competition: three St. Petersburg factories - Metallichesky, Obukhovsky and Putilovsky, as well as the Society of Nikolaev Factories and Shipyards (ONZiV) and the English Vickers plant. The competition was won by the Metal Plant with a project developed by the famous engineer A. G. Dukelsky. The mechanical part of the turret installations was developed on the basis of 305-mm turret installations for battleships of the Sevastopol type; to reduce weight, the gun was installed for the first time without the so-called “shirt”, directly in the clip. Nevertheless, the weight of the gun, compared to the 305 mm, increased from 50.7 to 83.8 tons. To increase the coasting speed, a coasting regulator and a coasting buffer were used. The roof of the tower was assembled from 125 mm armor plates, the walls of the tower from sheets 300 mm thick.
History of construction
On October 12, 1912, the ships ordered to the Baltic Shipyard received the names “Izmail” and “Kinburn”, and to the Admiralty - “Borodino” and “Navarin”. On December 6, after the ceremonial laying, the cruisers were officially included in the lists of the fleet, although the theoretical drawing of their hull had not yet been finally approved.
Design
In terms of armament, the Izmail-class battlecruisers were significantly superior to their contemporary dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. Most foreign battleships and battlecruisers were inferior to them in number, caliber and weight of the broadside, up to the "Washington" type battleships Rodney. The only rivals in terms of armament for the Izmails were American “standard” battleships. In terms of protection, the Izmails were inferior to most of their contemporary battleships - their armor was penetrated at most combat distances by 305 mm shells. Due to their superiority in speed and weapons, they could only count on success in a short-lived battle or a timely retreat. Comparing the Izmails with battlecruisers of other countries, especially English ones, generally loses its meaning - such is the superiority of Russian cruisers in armament.
In August 1913, the results of full-scale tests were obtained from the shooting of the “excluded ship No. 4” (the former battleship “Chesma”), on which elements of the armor protection of the new battleships were mounted, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. It turned out that the armor belt was penetrated by 305-mm shells at distances of 85-90 cable lengths - individual plates were pressed in, and the outer side was “broken out” even in cases where the armor plates were not penetrated; The flooring of the upper deck was destroyed, and the middle deck was destroyed by its fragments. On the Izmails already under construction, we had to limit ourselves to improving the armor plate fastening systems, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt and changing the weight distribution of the horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks.
By August 1914, the readiness by weight of the hull installed and being processed was 43% for Izmail, 38% for Kinburn, 30% for Borodin, and 20% for Navarina. The pace of construction lagged behind the approved schedules due to delays in the supply of materials and castings. Already on May 22, 1914, the launch dates of the first two ships were postponed to October of the same year. With the beginning of the war, there was a disruption in the supply of main caliber turrets. Some of the castings and forgings, mortars and propeller shaft brackets, manufactured in Germany, had to be ordered from the already overloaded factories of the Maritime Department. According to the new deadlines approved on December 20, the launch of the first two cruisers was postponed to May, the second to September 1915, and readiness for testing was postponed to May and August 1917, respectively, that is, a year behind schedule.
On the morning of June 9, 1915, the lead ship of the series, Izmail, was launched. On June 11, the Borodino was launched, and on October 17, the Kinburn. In accordance with the new classification announced by the Maritime Department on June 27, ships of the Izmail type were included in the class of battlecruisers.
After the launch of the three ships, construction work almost completely stopped. Only in the spring of 1916, all pre-launch work on the Navarin was urgently completed and on October 27, 1916, the cruiser launched.
As of April 15, 1917, the readiness of the cruisers Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin was as follows: in terms of hull, systems and devices - 65, 57, 52 and 50%; for already installed belt and deck armor - 36, 13, 5, 2%; for mechanisms - 66, 40, 22, 26.5%, for boilers - 66, 38.4, 7.2 and 2.5%. The completion date for the Izmail towers was postponed to the end of 1919, and the remaining ships to the next year. In the summer of 1917, a congress of shipyard workers, which decided to continue the construction of Izmail, at least for the sake of earning money, expressed a desire to convert the remaining ships of this type into commercial ships. In the preliminary studies, two conversion options were outlined: into cargo (or oil) ships with a carrying capacity of 16,000 tons and into oil barges (22,000 tons).
At the end of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to suspend the construction of a number of ships, including the Izmail series. During the Civil War, the hulls of battlecruisers remained near the walls of the factories. On July 19, 1923, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were excluded from the lists of the fleet, and on August 21, the ships were acquired “in their entirety” by the German company Alfred Kubats. On September 26, tugboats arrived in Petrograd for the Kinburn, and later for the other two. Boilers, mechanisms and other ship equipment were used in the national economy, partly during the repair and modernization of the remaining warships in service.
Several options have been put forward for completing the Izmail, including conversion into an aircraft carrier. This project arose in March 1925. It was planned to equip the ship with powerful artillery weapons and an air group consisting of 12 torpedo bombers, 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 artillery markers. The approximate displacement was 20,000-22,000 tons. The project was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A.I. Rykov on July 6, 1925. However, on March 16, 1926, a commission headed by I. S. Unshlikht stopped all work, and Izmail was scrapped.
In the early 30s, the cruiser's hull was dismantled. Some of the boilers were installed on the battleship Gangut. Three main caliber guns were mounted on specially designed railway transporters; after successful tests in 1932-1933. they were included in the coastal defense artillery of the Baltic Fleet. During the siege of Leningrad, they successfully fired at the Nazis' manpower, equipment and defensive structures.
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Notes
Literature
- L. A. Kuznetsov. Izmail-class battlecruisers. - St. Petersburg. : Gangut, 2011. - 159 p. - 500 copies. - ISBN 978-5-904180-28-7.
- Amirkhanov L.I. Towers for "Ishmael" // Citadel. - St. Petersburg, 1995. - No. 1. - pp. 63-77.
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An excerpt characterizing the Izmail-class battlecruisers
One old man, wearing a star, and another, a German official, with a cross on his neck, approached the people talking.“You see,” said the adjutant, “this is a complicated story. Then, two months ago, this proclamation appeared. They informed the Count. He ordered an investigation. So Gavrilo Ivanovich was looking for him, this proclamation was in exactly sixty-three hands. He will come to one thing: from whom do you get it? - That’s why. He goes to that one: who are you from? etc. we got to Vereshchagin... a half-trained merchant, you know, a little merchant, my dear,” the adjutant said, smiling. - They ask him: who do you get it from? And the main thing is that we know from whom it comes. He has no one else to rely on other than the postal director. But apparently there was a strike between them. He says: not from anyone, I composed it myself. And they threatened and begged, so he settled on it: he composed it himself. So they reported to the count. The count ordered to call him. “Who is your proclamation from?” - “I composed it myself.” Well, you know the Count! – the adjutant said with a proud and cheerful smile. “He flared up terribly, and just think: such impudence, lies and stubbornness!..
- A! The Count needed him to point to Klyucharyov, I understand! - said Pierre.
“It’s not necessary at all,” the adjutant said fearfully. – Klyucharyov had sins even without this, for which he was exiled. But the fact is that the count was very indignant. “How could you compose? - says the count. I took this “Hamburg newspaper” from the table. - Here she is. You didn’t compose it, but translated it, and you translated it badly, because you don’t even know French, you fool.” What do you think? “No,” he says, “I didn’t read any newspapers, I made them up.” - “And if so, then you are a traitor, and I will bring you to trial, and you will be hanged. Tell me, from whom did you receive it? - “I haven’t seen any newspapers, but I made them up.” It remains that way. The Count also called on his father: stand his ground. And they put him on trial and, it seems, sentenced him to hard labor. Now his father came to ask for him. But he's a crappy boy! You know, such a merchant's son, a dandy, a seducer, listened to lectures somewhere and already thinks that the devil is not his brother. After all, what a young man he is! His father has a tavern here near the Stone Bridge, so in the tavern, you know, there is a large image of the Almighty God and a scepter is presented in one hand, and an orb in the other; so he took this image home for several days and what did he do! I found a bastard painter...
In the middle of this new story, Pierre was called to the commander-in-chief.
Pierre entered Count Rastopchin's office. Rastopchin, wincing, rubbed his forehead and eyes with his hand, while Pierre entered. The short man was saying something and, as soon as Pierre entered, he fell silent and left.
- A! “Hello, great warrior,” said Rostopchin as soon as this man came out. – We’ve heard about your prouesses [glorious exploits]! But that's not the point. Mon cher, entre nous, [Between us, my dear,] are you a Freemason? - said Count Rastopchin in a stern tone, as if there was something bad in this, but that he intended to forgive. Pierre was silent. - Mon cher, je suis bien informe, [I, my dear, know everything well,] but I know that there are Freemasons and Freemasons, and I hope that you do not belong to those who, under the guise of saving the human race, want to destroy Russia.
“Yes, I’m a Freemason,” answered Pierre.
- Well, you see, my dear. You, I think, are not unaware that Messrs. Speransky and Magnitsky have been sent where they should be; the same was done with Mr. Klyucharyov, the same with others who, under the guise of building the temple of Solomon, tried to destroy the temple of their fatherland. You can understand that there are reasons for this and that I could not exile the local postal director if he were not a harmful person. Now I know that you sent him yours. crew for the rise from the city and even that you accepted papers from him for safekeeping. I love you and do not wish you harm, and since you are half my age, I, as a father, advise you to stop all relations with this kind of people and leave here yourself as soon as possible.
- But what, Count, is Klyucharyov’s fault? asked Pierre.
“It’s my business to know and not yours to ask me,” cried Rostopchin.
“If he is accused of distributing Napoleon’s proclamations, then this has not been proven,” said Pierre (without looking at Rastopchin), “and Vereshchagin...”
“Nous y voila, [It is so,”] - suddenly frowning, interrupting Pierre, Rostopchin cried out even louder than before. “Vereshchagin is a traitor and a traitor who will receive a well-deserved execution,” said Rostopchin with that fervor of anger with which people speak when remembering an insult. - But I did not call you in order to discuss my affairs, but in order to give you advice or orders, if you want it. I ask you to stop relations with gentlemen like Klyucharyov and get out of here. And I'll beat the crap out of whoever it is. - And, probably realizing that he seemed to be shouting at Bezukhov, who had not yet been guilty of anything, he added, taking Pierre by the hand in a friendly manner: - Nous sommes a la veille d "un desastre publique, et je n"ai pas le temps de dire des gentillesses a tous ceux qui ont affaire a moi. My head is spinning sometimes! Eh! bien, mon cher, qu"est ce que vous faites, vous personnellement? [We are on the eve of a general disaster, and I have no time to be polite to everyone with whom I have business. So, my dear, what are you doing, you personally?]
“Mais rien, [Yes, nothing,” answered Pierre, still without raising his eyes and without changing the expression of his thoughtful face.
The Count frowned.
- Un conseil d"ami, mon cher. Decampez et au plutot, c"est tout ce que je vous dis. A bon entendeur salut! Goodbye, my dear. “Oh, yes,” he shouted to him from the door, “is it true that the countess fell into the clutches of des saints peres de la Societe de Jesus?” [Friendly advice. Get out quickly, that's what I tell you. Blessed is he who knows how to obey!.. the holy fathers of the Society of Jesus?]
Pierre did not answer anything and, frowning and angry as he had never been seen, left Rostopchin.
When he arrived home, it was already getting dark. Eight people different people visited him that evening. Secretary of the committee, colonel of his battalion, manager, butler and various petitioners. Everyone had matters before Pierre that he had to resolve. Pierre did not understand anything, was not interested in these matters and gave only answers to all questions that would free him from these people. Finally, left alone, he printed out and read his wife’s letter.
“They are soldiers at the battery, Prince Andrey has been killed... an old man... Simplicity is submission to God. You have to suffer... the meaning of everything... you have to put it together... your wife is getting married... You have to forget and understand...” And he, going to the bed, fell on it without undressing and immediately fell asleep.
When he woke up the next morning, the butler came to report that a police official had come from Count Rastopchin on purpose to find out whether Count Bezukhov had left or was leaving.
About ten different people who had business with Pierre were waiting for him in the living room. Pierre hastily dressed, and, instead of going to those who were waiting for him, he went to the back porch and from there went out through the gate.
From then until the end of the Moscow devastation, none of the Bezukhovs’ household, despite all the searches, saw Pierre again and did not know where he was.
The Rostovs remained in the city until September 1, that is, until the eve of the enemy’s entry into Moscow.
After Petya joined Obolensky’s Cossack regiment and his departure to Belaya Tserkov, where this regiment was being formed, fear came over the countess. The thought that both of her sons are at war, that both of them have left under her wing, that today or tomorrow each of them, and maybe both together, like the three sons of one of her friends, could be killed, for the first time just now, this summer, it came to her mind with cruel clarity. She tried to get Nikolai to come to her, she wanted to go to Petya herself, to place him somewhere in St. Petersburg, but both of them turned out to be impossible. Petya could not be returned except with the regiment or through transfer to another active regiment. Nikolai was somewhere in the army and after his last letter, in which he described in detail his meeting with Princess Marya, did not give any information about himself. The Countess did not sleep at night and, when she fell asleep, she saw her murdered sons in her dreams. After much advice and negotiations, the count finally came up with a means to calm the countess. He transferred Petya from Obolensky’s regiment to Bezukhov’s regiment, which was being formed near Moscow. Although Petya remained in military service, but with this transfer the countess had the consolation of seeing at least one son under her wing and hoped to arrange her Petya in such a way that she would never let him out again and would always enroll him in places of service where he could not get into battle. While only Nicolas was in danger, it seemed to the countess (and she even repented of it) that she loved the eldest more than all the other children; but when the youngest, the naughty one, who was a bad student, who broke everything in the house and who was boring everyone, Petya, this snub-nosed Petya, with his cheerful black eyes, a fresh blush and a little fluff on his cheeks, ended up there, with these big, scary, cruel men who they fight something there and find something joyful in it - then it seemed to the mother that she loved him more, much more than all her children. The closer the time approached when the expected Petya was supposed to return to Moscow, the more the countess’s anxiety increased. She already thought that she would never see this happiness. The presence of not only Sonya, but also her beloved Natasha, even her husband, irritated the countess. “What do I care about them, I don’t need anyone except Petya!” - she thought.
In the last days of August, the Rostovs received a second letter from Nikolai. He wrote from the Voronezh province, where he was sent for horses. This letter did not reassure the countess. Knowing that one son was out of danger, she began to worry even more about Petya.
Despite the fact that already on the 20th of August almost all of the Rostovs’ acquaintances left Moscow, despite the fact that everyone tried to persuade the countess to leave as soon as possible, she did not want to hear anything about leaving until her treasure, her beloved, returned. Petya. On August 28, Petya arrived. The sixteen-year-old officer did not like the painfully passionate tenderness with which his mother greeted him. Despite the fact that his mother hid from him her intention not to let him out from under her wing, Petya understood her intentions and, instinctively fearing that he would become soft with his mother, that he would not be fooled (as he thought to himself), he treated him coldly with her, avoided her and during his stay in Moscow exclusively stuck to the company of Natasha, for whom he always had a special, almost loving brotherly tenderness.
Due to the count's usual carelessness, on August 28 nothing was ready for departure, and the carts expected from the Ryazan and Moscow villages to lift all the property from the house arrived only on the 30th.
From August 28 to 31, all of Moscow was in trouble and movement. Every day, thousands of wounded in the Battle of Borodino were brought to the Dorogomilovskaya outpost and transported around Moscow, and thousands of carts, with residents and property, went to other outposts. Despite Rastopchin's posters, or independently of them, or as a result of them, the most contradictory and strange news was transmitted throughout the city. Who said that no one was ordered to leave; who, on the contrary, said that they had lifted all the icons from the churches and that everyone was being expelled by force; who said that there was another battle after Borodino, in which the French were defeated; who said, on the contrary, that the entire Russian army was destroyed; who spoke about the Moscow militia, which would go with the clergy ahead to the Three Mountains; who quietly told that Augustine was not ordered to travel, that traitors had been caught, that the peasants were rioting and robbing those who were leaving, etc., etc. But that was only what they said, and in essence, those who were traveling and those who remained (despite the fact that there had not yet been a council in Fili, at which it was decided to leave Moscow) - everyone felt, although they did not show it, that Moscow would certainly be surrendered and that they had to get out themselves as soon as possible and save your property. It was felt that everything should suddenly break apart and change, but until the 1st, nothing had changed yet. Just as a criminal who is being led to execution knows that he is about to die, but still looks around him and straightens his poorly worn hat, so Moscow involuntarily continued its ordinary life, although it knew that the time of destruction was near, when everything would be torn apart. those conditional relations of life to which we are accustomed to submit.
During these three days preceding the capture of Moscow, the entire Rostov family was in various everyday troubles. The head of the family, Count Ilya Andreich, constantly traveled around the city, collecting rumors circulating from all sides, and at home he made general superficial and hasty orders about preparations for departure.
The Countess watched over the cleaning of things, was dissatisfied with everything and followed Petya, who was constantly running away from her, jealous of him for Natasha, with whom he spent all his time. Sonya alone managed the practical side of the matter: packing things. But Sonya was especially sad and silent during all this lately. Nicolas's letter, in which he mentioned Princess Marya, evoked in her presence the countess's joyful reasoning about how she saw God's providence in Princess Marya's meeting with Nicolas.
“I was never happy then,” said the countess, “when Bolkonsky was Natasha’s fiancé, but I always wanted, and I have a presentiment, that Nikolinka would marry the princess.” And how good that would be!
Sonya felt that this was true, that the only way to improve the Rostovs’ affairs was to marry a rich woman and that the princess was a good match. But she was very sad about it. Despite her grief, or perhaps precisely as a result of her grief, she took upon herself all the difficult worries of cleaning and packing orders and was busy all day long. The Count and Countess turned to her when they needed to be ordered something. Petya and Natasha, on the contrary, not only did not help their parents, but for the most part everyone in the house was bothered and disturbed. And all day long you could almost hear their running, screaming and causeless laughter in the house. They laughed and rejoiced not at all because there was a reason for their laughter; but their souls were joyful and cheerful, and therefore everything that happened was a reason for joy and laughter for them. Petya was happy because, having left home as a boy, he returned (as everyone told him) a fine man; It was fun because he was at home, because he had left Belaya Tserkov, where there was no hope of getting into battle soon, and ended up in Moscow, where one of these days they would fight; and most importantly, it was cheerful because Natasha, whose mood he always obeyed, was cheerful. Natasha was cheerful because she had been sad for too long, and now nothing reminded her of the reason for her sadness, and she was healthy. She was also cheerful because there was a person who admired her (the admiration of others was the ointment of the wheels that was necessary for her car to move completely freely), and Petya admired her. The main thing is that they were cheerful because the war was near Moscow, that they would fight at the outpost, that they were distributing weapons, that everyone was running, leaving somewhere, that in general something extraordinary was happening, which is always joyful for a person, especially for a young person.
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